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Judicial Experimentation with a Strict
Products Liability Rule: A

Comparison of the Law in the
United Kingdom, Louisiana and

United States' Common Law
Jurisdictions*
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU**
CATHERINE GARVEY***

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-nineteenth century, products liability law has un-

dergone significant modifications. The applicable doctrine has oscillated between contract and tort theories; fault and no-fault
liability schemes have competed for predominance. Despite attempts to create an internationally accepted liability norm, different
legal systems continue to espouse differing perceptions of the liability formula in the products area. In addition, even in jurisdictions
in which courts adhere to identical liability theories, there is disagreement as to the application and implications of the same standard. This article attempts to set the shifting doctrinal character of
products liability analysis into.a comparative perspective principally
between common law and civil law systems.
It is the perceived wisdom that the United States' Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the jurisprudence which preceded and accompanied it represents the most advanced view of
strict products liability. This common law approach contrasts
sharply with the current English doctrinal position on products liaCopyright 1983 Thomas Carbonneau.
* The author is an Associate Professor of Law, Fellow and Assistant Director of the
Eason-Weinmann Center of Comparative Law at Tulane University School of Law. I am
greatly indebted to Professor Aubrey L. Diamond for his kindness in reading the section on
English law. The opinions expressed and any errors or omissions are my sole responsibility.
*** Third-year student at Tulane University School of Law and member of the Tulane
Law Review editorial staff. Ms. Garvey has been chosen as a law clerk for the Honorable
Albert Tate, Jr., United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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bility. The dichotomy exists in part because of differing concepts of
the role of fault in the imposition of legal liability and differing social welfare structures. The English view, however, may be modified in the near future. Efforts are being undertaken by the
European Economic Community to harmonize the law of Member
States by incorporating a strict standard of products liability in the
law of all Member States in order to foster a fair trading position
among the European partners. Some European jurisdictions already have adopted a strict products liability rule in their national
law. France, for example, has employed both contractual and delictual liability notions to elaborate a no-fault approach. In addition,
both the Council of Europe's Convention on Products Liability
(signed by Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) and the
unimplemented EEC Draft Directive on Products Liability advance
a no-fault standard of liability which significantly varies from the
American standard.
The international stature of the problem has, to some extent,
diverted attention from the experimentation with products liability
rules in United States jurisdictions. For example, the decisional law
in Louisiana, a jurisdiction which merges systemic and substantive
features of the common law and civil law traditions in a sui generis
fashion, has evidenced certain doctrinal trends which bespeak a
unique application of traditional civilian concepts and a distinctly
advanced variation on the already liberal American position. After
assessing English and American law, this article attempts to integrate and evaluate Louisiana jurisprudence on products liability to
ascertain whether the Louisiana experimentation sheds new light on
the policy dilemma that is embedded in the ongoing products liability debate.
A.

Creative Jurisprudenceand the Law of Torts: A Preliminary
Background to Decision-Making in the
Products LiabilityArea

A cursory reading of judicial opinions tends to confirm the
view that judicial rulings are chiefly the product of the logical operation of doctrinal rules objectively and impartially applied by valuefree tribunals. It is at least the lay view that the adjudicatory process is founded upon a quasi-scientific methodology which leads to
highly technical determinations which escape the wisdom of the
common and uninitiated mind. The outcome of cases not only is
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mandated by logical deductions, but also is consecrated by the historical evolution of the applicable rules. August magistrates do little
more than engage in the mechanistic process of finding the appropriate rule and, with the help of logic, tailor it to the particular facts
of the case. Such is the view, admittedly exaggerated, of the judicial
decision-making process which was current in France throughout
most of the nineteenth century and which can be said to be shared
by the twentieth century public in both common law and civil law
jurisdictions. Under this perception, the resolution of disputes by
the judicial system is a remote and detached process; automated
priests of logic simply interpose indisputable and irrevocable insights into the daily life of litigants.
A more informed and studied assessment of judicial decisions
reveals that the explicit doctrinal substance of the opinions masks
their more subdued political character-that these seemingly objective and impartial determinations are replete with social policy undercurrents. Judges are concerned not only with maintaining the
doctrinal purity and historical integrity of legal rules, but also with
the social and political impact of their rulings. Despite its undeniable commitment to rigorous logical analysis, the process of judicial
decision-making is more akin to art than science. It is intrinsically
subjective, relying ultimately upon a process of value judgments.
Judges are appointed and courts are maintained to dispense
justice within the setting of the practical circumstances of allegedly
wrongful conduct and injury. Rendering justice demands that facts
and documentation be assessed in light of a larger and perhaps
more theoretical framework. The resolution of an individual case
should not only be equitable, but should also serve the goal of maintaining an orderly society. It is not too much of an exaggeration to
state that even the most apparently trivial personal injury case involves not only the pitting of interests of one individual against
those of another, but also incorporating those competing claimsone for protection and vindication, the other for freedom of action
and justification-into a wider social perspective which affects the
very raison d'tre of the human community and civilization. In a
word, the rendering of justice through the courts is, first and foremost, a social and political process centering upon compromise, or
at least a value judgment as to what is in the best interest of society.
The courts play an integral part in deciding what interests society
will promote, what choices it will make between competing needs,
and what solutions it will adopt to multi-faceted problems.
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The task of the courts is tantamount, in some respects, to the
artist's quest to capture through his art form the quintessence of the
physical and spiritual reality that is outside of and resistant to his
artistic perspective. Judges must invent or use existing legal concepts and rules to create solutions to dilemmas posed by antagonistic individual interests. In reaching their determinations and in
order to have these determinations accepted by society-to preserve,
in effect, their power base and institutional credibility-judges appeal to and articulate their purported accommodation in terms of
the "immutable" logic of time-honored rules. In applying these
rules and deploying these familiar notions, the courts possess the not
inconsiderable discretion of modifying and moulding rules-interpreting them both in relation to the specific factual pattern of the
given case and, more particularly, in reference to the policy dimension that is implicit in the dispute.
The process of reaching an accommodation between competing
individual and social interests transcends the objectively quantifiable aspect of legal doctrine. Ultimately, judicial determinations reflect an established consensus between members of society and their
leaders as to what justice should be on a specific issue in light of the
particular circumstances. In the law of torts, this consensus is expressed in terms of a liability question: upon which actor does one
impose liability and upon what basis does one justify the imposition
of liability for a given conduct?
In the most simple historical terms, the law of torts has undergone significant modifications in regard to the basic justification and
rationale given for the imposition of legal liability upon would-be
tortfeasors. Although the concept of legal wrong was rarely, if ever,
equated in legal doctrine with the notion of moral fault, throughout
most of the nineteenth century the courts, for both practical and theoretical reasons, were loath to impose liability without a finding of
fault-fault being a concept anchored in the notion of blameworthy
conduct. During this period, the plaintiff in a tort action was required to establish that the defendant's conduct had fallen below a
reasonable community standard of due care. In accordance with the
then reigning ideas of laissez-faire individualism, the scope of liability was seen in fairly restrictive terms; liability would be imposed
only upon an actor who had engaged in a clearly culpable act. Both
English and American decisional law reflected this firm commitment to fault-based liability.
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The advent of a highly technological society brought not only
the demise of the laissez-faire ethic, but also a corresponding change
in the legal concepts used to assess the liability issue. The law of
torts ceased to be a vehicle for the imposition of sanctions primarily
for reprehensible conduct and came to be seen as a body of law
designed to compensate accident victims for their injuries-to place
the cost of accidents upon those parties who were best able to bear
the financial burden. The determination of whether liability should
be imposed upon an actor depended upon the courts' perception of
social engineering considerations-upon their assessment of the role
of the insurance factor in litigation and their willingness to effectuate transfers of wealth among the litigants almost without reference
to a fault notion.
This modification of tort analysis, emphasizing the compensatory as opposed to the punitive function of tort law, originated
through a reinterpretation of the concepts used to assess legal liability in tort law. The notion of proximate causation or legal cause
gave the courts a wider, if not an almost unlimited, discretion to find
a solvent defendant who, despite what appeared to be the reasonable quality of his conduct and its remoteness to the occurrence, was
in the best position to bear the financial responsibility for an accident. The courts also interpreted the requirements for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in such a flexible manner as
to shift an impossiblle burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, making him liable without proof of actual fault on his part.
Finally, the courts articulated the concept of strict liability thereby
consecrating the evolution from fault-based liability. The principle
of strict liability which at first was applied to inherently dangerous
activities was extended gradually to manufactured products.
B. Arguments Against Strict Products LiabilityI
There are a number of arguments which can be invoked against
extending the principle of strict liability to products litigation. Although the link between morality and law is a continuing enigma
and source of controversy, it can be argued that a no-fault rule con1. For the arguments elaborated in this section, the author has relied upon Law
Commission for England & Wales, Liabilityfor Defective Products (Working Paper No. 64),
7 LAW COMM'N WORKING PAPERS 33-37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LAW COMM'N No. 64].
The substance of these arguments has been reformulated to concord with the format of the

present article. This general acknowledgement eliminates any need to include further
references.
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stitutes an inadequate moral basis upon which to impose legal liability. Also, the imposition of a strict legal standard might
discourage manufacturers from developing new products since no
element of foreseeability or actual care would limit the scope of
their liability. The cost of insurance, if it is available at all, might be
astronomical; society, as a consequence, would either be deprived of
industrial innovations or pay a substantial price for new consumer
goods. In addition, it can be argued that the evidentiary problems
to which a negligence analysis can give rise may not be as great as
they initially appear. While the state of technological knowledge is
sophisticated, it is available in one form or another to competent
legal counsel, and proof of the existence of a defect does raise a
strong presumption that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care. Presumably, the application of a strict liability principle
in the products liability context would lead to an increase in
claims-some of which might be spurious-and, consequently, to
higher insurance rates. Under a strict liability regime, manufacturers might not only have less incentive to maintain strict quality controls, but also smaller manufacturers might be threatened with
financial disaster.
2
C. Supportfor the Strict Liability Rule

The taking into account of social policy considerations in judicial determinations inevitably involves a compromise between competing alternatives. The ultimate choice between these alternatives
is justified if it promotes the greater social good in light of the current evolution of society. With this reasoning in mind, it seems the
scale of persuasiveness falls in favor of adopting a strict liability rule
in products litigation. Such an analytic framework would provide
that an injured plaintiff would be compensated by the manufacturer
for his injuries resulting from a defect in the manufacturer's product
upon proof of the existence of a defect in the product and proof that
the defect caused the injury. The plaintiff would not be required to
prove that the defect was attributable to the negligence of the manufacturer. The elimination of any reference to a negligence factor
and the concomitant imposition upon manufacturers of a duty to
guarantee that their products are free of harmful defects is supported by a number of factors.
For example, given the representations manufacturers have
2. See id at 29-33.
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made to the public about their products and the profits they stand to
derive from the sale of the products, manufacturers have a moral
obligation to guarantee that their products contain no dangerous defects. Here, the notion of morally justifiable legal liability and the
need to articulate a decisional law which provides for viable social
policy judgments seem to merge. No matter how careful the manufacturing process, defects are inevitable in the context of mass production. Although both the manufacturer and the consumer derive
benefits from this type of market, it seems that the manufacturer is
in the better position to assume the risk of the inevitable defect and
to account for it in their prices as they would any other business
cost. Manufacturers are better able and have a greater incentive to
insure themselves against such a risk than the individual consumervictim. Moreover, it seems that this type of liability should be directed at the manufacturer rather than the retailer since the former
bears primary, if not total, responsibility for the quality of the products that are sold to the public. Financial considerations and economy of litigation also militate in favor of this position.
Finally, it seems unjust and excessive to require that a plaintiff
injured as a result of a defect in a product prove not only that 'a
defect exists and bears a causal relation to his injury, but also that
the defect arose as a result of negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Such a burden of proof not only can be regarded as fundamentally unfair, tipping the balance of justice in favor of
manufacturers, but also it may be a difficult, if not an impossible,
burden for the plaintiff to effectively discharge. The plaintiff is a
stranger, in most cases, to the manufacturing process and would
have to locate the source of unreasonable conduct in perhaps a complex enterprise. Simply reversing the burden of proof may not be
sufficient; it might make liability determinations too dependent
upon arbitrary and inconsistent interpretations of what constitutes
reasonable manufacturing conduct. In some cases, general and
somewhat perfunctory proof of reasonable care might be sufficient,
while in other cases the courts might impose a more stringent and
perhaps unbending concept of the legal duty that must be satisfied.
Moreover, under the latter theory, the standard becomes one of
strict liability in all but name.
A fairly plausible deterrent argument exists which lends some
support to the application of a strict liability rule in products litigation. It is conceivable that the imposition of a strict legal duty
would lead to a higher standard of quality control in manufacturing
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processes, eliminating at least token measures and perhaps some errors that appear to be inevitable. Control standards are likely to be
increased and maintained because the price for not doing so, when a
strict liability rule applies, is clear and unavoidable. In some instances, the manufacturer may find it more cost efficient to permit
defects rather than improve the quality of his plant or operation.
The consequences of such a business judgment should be borne by
the manufacturer and not the consumer.
II.

THE AMERICAN EXAMPLE

3

During the nineteenth century, American courts, following the
English example, applied the privity-of-contract rule: injured plaintiffs could not bring an action against a manufacturer for the injuries they suffered as a result of a defect in a product unless they had
been in a contractual relationship with the defendant. 4 The reverence paid by the courts to the celebrated maxim "no privity, no liability" abated once the courts began to perceive that the need to
protect developing industries from consumer claims no longer was
so important. In the early twentieth century, courts began to voice
an apparent general consensus that gave priority to the claims of
injured consumers against the large, profit-making, and sometimes
ruthless manufacturer. 5
When the public, for example, became aware of the fact that
food manufacturers often adulterated their products and sometimes
made them patently unsafe, courts created an exception to the privity rule in litigation dealing with food products. 6 This exception
soon became the rule for all products litigation. The basis for a
cause of action and a theory of liability was found, not in contract,
but in tort doctrine. 7 In the famous case, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,8 Justice Cardozo stated that, while only exceptions could be
made to the requirement of privity under contract law, these exceptions were the rule in tort: tort law provides that all persons, including manufacturers of products, owe a duty of reasonable care to
3.

For a discussion of products liability in the United States, see generally D.

J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1981).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id at 94-98.
Id
Id at 97-98.
Id
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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others. 9 According to Cardozo's reasoning in MacPherson, the
existence of a defect in a product constituted a breach of the duty
not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm: "If the nature
of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."' 0
Under the MacPherson rule, parties injured as a result of a defect in
a product but who lacked a relationship of privity with the manufacturer could sue the manufacturer in tort under a negligence theory. The manufacturer, however, still could exculpate himself by
establishing that he had not been negligent in the manufacture of
the product.
Despite the advances achieved by the MacPherson opinion, the
use of a negligence-based doctrine soon was called into question.
Some courts began to voice the belief that products cases should be
decided upon the basis of a strict liability rule. Justice Traynor's
seminal concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. I is
illustrative. There, the plaintiff, a waitress, brought an action
against the defendant for injuries arising from the explosion of a
Coca-Cola bottle in her hand. In the trial court proceeding, the2
plaintiff invoked and successfully argued a res ipsa loquitur theory:'
Although the California Supreme Court upheld the lower court decision,' 3 Justice Traynor, in his concurring opinion, argued that the
result, although justified, should have been reached upon the basis
of another legal theory which eliminated any reference to a negligence standard:
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like
the present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized that
a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that
he has placed on the market, knowing it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings ...
Even if there is no negligence . . .public policy demands

that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products
that reach the market.14
9. Id at 388, 111 N.E. at 1052.
10.

Id

11.
12.
13.
14.

24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
Id.
Id at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440 (citations omitted). See also Traynor, The Ways and

at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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The application of the traditional negligence analysis in this
context was also challenged, this time by an entire court, in the
landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. '5 There, a
car accident allegedly occurred as a result of a defective steering
wheel. Inferring from the record that the statement of the facts was
true, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that a new car carried with it an implied warranty by the manufacturer that it was
reasonably suitable for use. 16 Presumably, such a warranty arose
from the representations that the manufacturer made to the public.
The implied warranty did not have a contractual nature, but arose
as a result of the manufacturer's placing the car on the market. It
extended, in the court's view, not only to the buyer of the car and his
family, but also to other people who were in the car with the owner's
consent. A defect in the car constituted a breach of the implied
warranty. '7
The implied warranty rule established by the Henningsen court
arose as the result of the application of tort law principles and not
the rules of contract law. By making representations to the public as
to the quality of the product and placing the product on the market,
the manufacturer was under a duty not to deceive the public or expose it to an unreasonable risk of harm. When an injured plaintiff
established a causal link between the defect and his injury, the court
ruled that the warranty had been breached.' 8 In articulating its reasoning, the Henningsen court never referred to a negligence standard or a res ipsa loquitur presumption of negligence. Proof of a
mechanical failure in a new car and of a causal relationship was
sufficient to establish a breach of warranty, and liability. In effect,
the implied warranty in tort imposed a strict legal duty upon the
manufacturer to provide the public with products that were free of
defects. 19

These refinements, challenges, and additions to the MacPherson rule culminated in the celebrated opinion in Greenman v. Yuba
Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). The classic
essay on this subject is Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). The companion piece to this essay is Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

16. Id at 368, 161 A.2d at 76.
17. Id
18. Id at 372, 161 A.2d at 79-80.
19. Id at 369, 161 A.2d at 77. See generally supra, note 3 and authorities cited therein.
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Power Products.20 There, the plaintiff was injured when a piece of
wood flew out of a power tool he was using. In his action against
the manufacturer, the plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred as
a result of the defective design and construction of the tool.2' The
proceedings below resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, held that the jury
verdict for the plaintiff could be upheld upon the basis both of
breach of warranty theory and negligence-the two theories invoked by the plaintiff in his original claim. 22 More significantly,
however, Justice Traynor added that the same verdict could be upheld upon the basis of a strict liability rule in tort:
Although in these cases [involving food and other products] strict
liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them,
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but
imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to
define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
of
make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. 23
The Greenman reasoning was incorporated into section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 Section 402A holds manufacturers liable for products "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer" even when those manufacturers
have "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of...
[their] product[s]." 25 The American theory of products liability also
includes the notion of enterprise liability under which all parties involved in the marketing process can be held liable to any consumer,
user, or bystander injured by the defective product. The courts justify enterprise liability by reasoning that injured plaintiffs should
have the best possible and most convenient remedy at their disposal
against the party in the best position to provide them with
compensation. 26
20. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
21. Id at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
22. Id at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
23. Id at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MENT]. See NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 34-37.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 402A(1), (2)(a).

RESTATE-

26. See Gibson, Products Liability in the United States and England- The Dfferences

and Why, 3 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1978).
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Despite these advances, problems remain and the very notion
of strict liability for products appears to be contested by some
United States' courts. Although improved in theory, the position of
the "powerless consumer" 27 still may be quite precarious. For instance, the 402A standard of strict products liability contains the curious phrase "unreasonably dangerous.1 28 Under a literal reading
of the section, it is not sufficient that the plaintiff establish defectiveness plus causation; in addition, he must establish that the defectiveness was "unreasonably dangerous." Despite the disclaimer that
"all possible care" will not exculpate the manufacturer of a product,
a commingling of negligence and strict liability notions appears to
take place in the language of section 402A. Some have argued that
the "unreasonably dangerous" clause would prevent the courts from
imposing liability upon sugar manufacturers for the injury that their
product caused to a diabetic.29 Such reasoning sheds no light upon
the function of the clause in articulating a strict liability rule; it is
specious, in fact, since the sugar could not be considered defective in
the first place. In such a case, the injury arises not from the faulty
condition of the product, but rather from the diabetic's physical condition and her own carelessness.
The "unreasonably dangerous" clause in section 402A has created confusion and contributed inconsistency and unpredictability
in judicial opinions. 30 As previously mentioned, one wonders
whether there are two or three elements to establishing an action in
strict products liability: defectiveness plus causation, or defectiveness which is unreasonably dangerous plus causation. In light of
this fundamental ambiguity, one also could ask whether the purpose
of the law is to create a special type of liability rule for products
which is neither negligence nor strict liability-a sui generis rule.
Does the Restatement propose a standard of liability which occupies
an intermediary position between negligence and strict liability, requiring proof of fault be found in the creation of an undue risk of
harm through mass production of consumer goods in society? Such
a formulation, however, appears estranged from the Greenman gravamen and from the 402A disclaimer that due care will not suffice as
27. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1973).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 402A comment i.
29. See NOEL & PHILLIPS,supranote 3, at 415. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK

28.

OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).

30. See NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 407-12.
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an effective defense. Public policy considerations underlying the
strict rule would require the imposition of liability every time a consumer or user of a product is harmed by a defect in a product, no
matter how careful and prudent a manufacturer may have been.
Such a determination is a question of social policy engineering and
economic considerations, and should not be confused with moral
blameworthiness which is associated with findings of legal fault.
The "unreasonably dangerous" clause disrupts the unbending direction and logic of the strict liability rule.
Arguably then, the decisional law and the Restatement have established a new liability formula, one which disregards considerations of negligence and adopts a no-fault base. A survey of products
liability litigation, however, clearly indicates that some courts have
looked upon this no-fault formula with some circumspection and
have manipulated it so as to reintegrate, albeit implicitly, a fault
component into the determination. 3' Under the applicable doctrine,
proof of defectiveness occupies the center of attention; by making
this a difficult task, the courts have effectively reintroduced a reasonable conduct standard into the no-fault standard. This is especially true with regard to design defects. 32 For some courts, the
transfer of wealth between litigants cannot take place without there
being an unreasonable deviation from a socially accepted norm,
even under a strict liability rationale. Only that which is unreasonable will amount to actionable defectiveness under this reasoning.
Other attempts have been made to place limitations upon the
plaintiff-consumer's ability to recover under a strict products liability rule. The most celebrated attempt involved the measure of damages and is illustrated by the Seely-Santor debate. 33 In essence, the
question centers upon whether an action in strict tort liability should
enable the plaintiff to recover for economic loss as well as personal
injury damages. Such a fusion of remedies would discount almost
totally any distinction between a cause of action in tort and one
based upon contractual remedies following the Uniform Commercial Code's implied and express warranty theories (the latter theory
usually requiring some form of privity in order for the warranties to
apply). Although the allowance of economic loss under a tort action
31.

See NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 475-83.

32. Id at 358-61.
33. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also NOEL &
PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 293-308.
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would substantially eliminate the doctrinal technicalities which
could hamper an injured consumer, the courts are divided as to
whether such an infringement on the integrity of legal concepts is
warranted even in the name of the "powerless consumer."
While problems still attend the evolution of American products
liability law, significant steps have been taken to enhance the position of consumers and to place the financial burden for accidents
resulting from the use of products upon manufacturers. The notion
of market-share liability, which emerged in the recent California
case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,34 illustrates not only that
products liability doctrine remains a frontier area of legal innovation, but also that the public policy mandate of consumer protection
still governs, to some extent, in products litigation. Indeed, the central inquiry in American jurisprudence centers upon whether attempts at imposing restraints will gain the upper hand over the full
implications of a strict products liability rule.
III.

THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

The English law of products liability certainly has not
progressed with the same momentum and force as its American
counterpart. Although the privity barrier has been overcome, strict
liability does not apply in English products liability litigation-at
least not expressly. To reach liability determinations, English courts
invoke a negligence analysis and hold manufacturers to a standard
of reasonable conduct. It has been suggested that the difference in
doctrinal approach between these two common law jurisdictions can
be accounted for by the fact that English and American judges have
markedly differing attitudes toward judicial decision-making.3 5 Unlike their American counterparts, English judges are more reluctant
to assert a policy-making role, which the application of a strict liability rule in the products context unequivocally would lead to if it
were announced by a court. 36
It has been suggested that the reserved posture of the English
courts can be attributed to several factors. First, the absence of a
written and generally worded constitution has precluded the development of a strong tradition of judicial decision-making present in
the American model. Second and relatedly, in some areas of litiga34. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).

35. See Gibson, supra note 26, at 516-22.
36. See id
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tion, English courts appear to prefer a loosely-defined body of legal
doctrine, regarding it sufficient to provide protection to the parties
involved, i.e., the individual consumer need not be granted any special legal remedy against the manufacturer. Third, by their intellectual training, English judges tend to view the law and its evolution
through the prism of analytical philosophy. The tenets of sociological jurisprudence and legal pragmatism, a strong tradition in the
United States, has only had a limited impact in England by comparison. Finally, the greater diversity of jurisdictions gives United
States courts more independence and flexibility,37thereby promoting
innovation in the articulation of legal doctrine.
Despite its reticence, it seems that the English judiciary will not
be able to avoid the influence of a more creative vision of judicial
decision-making. Tort litigation is a propitious area in which to deploy this intrinsic capacity of the courts to accommodate legal doctrine with the changing character of society. There the courts
constantly are called upon to devise solutions to emerging social
problems and to achieve a compromise between competing social
interests.
A.

Background to Possible Reform

From 1973 to 1978, the Royal Commission on Civil Liability
and Compensation for Personal Injury (known as the Pearson Commission) undertook a comprehensive examination of the law governing personal injury claims. 38 Its term of reference directed it in
relevant part
[t]o consider to what extent, in what circumstances and by
what means compensation should be payable in respect of death
or personal injury (including ante-natal injury) suffered by any
person ... through the manufacture, supply or use of goods or
services ... having regard to the cost and other implications of
whether by
the arrangements for the recovery of compensation,
39
way of compulsory insurance or otherwise.
37. See id
38. See

ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL

INJURY, CMD. 70541 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION); LAW COMM'N No. 64,

supra note 1, at 1. See also Mountstephen, Compensationfor Personal Injury: The Royal
Commission's Report, 122 SOLIC. J. 241 (1978). See generally Marsh, Products Liability in the
Light of the Recommendations of the Law Commission and the Pearson Commission, 3 J.
PROD. LIAB. 173 (1979).
39. See LAW COMM'N No. 64, supra note 1, at 2.
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In the products liability area, the creation of the Commission
was designed to respond, at least implicitly, to a number of domestic
and international developments.40 First, there was an increasing
concern, both domestically and internationally, about consumer
40. In Chapter 22 of its report, the Commission stated:
1195 Products liability must be considered in the context of public concern
to protect the interests of the consumer. The recent growth of pressure groups and
other organisations representing those interests is a world wide phenomenon.
Much of this activity is concerned with the need to minimise the risk of death or
personal injury caused by defective products.
1196 Recent years have seen a parallel growth of interest in products liability itself. Again this is international; and indeed the subject has international
dimensions. The manufacture of components, the assembly of the finished product, the purchase of the product and the injury itself--these could all take place in
different countries with different legal provisions. The Standing Conference on
Private International Law at the Hague produced in 1973 a Convention designed
to establish greater uniformity in deciding which country's laws should be applicable in such circumstances. As to what those laws should be, international deliberations have included discussions by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, and a spate of conferences.
1197 Two international documents bear directly on our remit. The first is
the Council of Europe's 'Convention on Products Liability in regard to Personal
Injury and Death', known as the 'Strasbourg Convention'. This Convention was
opened for signature by member states in January 1977. It has been signed by
Austria, Belgium, France and Luxembourg.. .. The second of these documents
is a draft EEC Directive, on which we understand that the Economic and Social
Committee and the European Assembly are expected to report shortly to the EEC
Commission ...
1198 The Strasbourg Convention is confined to personal injury and death.
The draft EEC Directive covers damage to personal property. Both envisage the
imposition of strict liability on the producer. Either accession to the one or the
issue of the other would mean substantial changes in the negligence based system
of tort liability which applies to producers in the United Kingdom at present. We
are not alone in this respect. For example, neither the Netherlands nor the Federal
Republic of Germany have a regime of strict liability in tort for products.
The Law Commirsions' Report
1199 In November 1971, the Lord Chancellor asked the Law Commission,
and the Lord Advocate asked the Scottish Law Commission, 'to consider whether
the existing law governing compensation for personal injury, damage to property
or any other loss caused by defective products is adequate, and to recommend what
improvements, if any, in the law are needed to ensure that additional remedies are
provided and against whom such remedies should be available'. Our own subsequent terms of reference with respect to products liability overlapped with theirs.
ere were nevertheless important differences. The Law Commissions were asked
to consider 'damage to property or any other loss', as well as personal injury,
whereas our own terms of reference excluded property damage. On the other
hand, the Law Commissions saw themselves as limited to considering change
within the framework of tort and contract law, whereas we were not thus confined.
1200 We have benefited from these concurrent deliberations in three respects. First, our own consideration of the issues was assisted by the publication in
1975 of the Law Commissions' joint working paper (Law Commission Working
Paper No. 64; Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No. 20). Secondly, the
Commissions were good enough to send us copies of the comments they received
on that working paper, provided that the contributor concerned had no objection.
Thirdly, we have been able to take account of the Commissions' final report. . . in
the course of drafting our own. We have thought it right to explain our own views
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protection and safety. One of the objectives of the Commission was
to reconsider legal liability theories so as to minimize the risk of
death and personal injury resulting from defective products. 4' Second, the recommendations of the Commission corresponded to the
goal of unifying and harmonizing European law in major substantive areas.42 While the Strasbourg Convention 43 to some extent and
the recent EEC Draft Directive" advocate the adoption of strict liability in the products area, English products liability theory is still
based upon the concept of negligence. The Commission recommendations would align English law with proposals contained in the
45
EEC Draft Directive.
The Royal Commission's recommendations on products liabil46
ity have yet to be adopted and have generated some controversy.
While a number of EEC jurisdictions have adopted or are moving
47
toward adopting a strict liability rule in the products liability area,
and emphasise those considerations which carried the greatest weight with us; but
the working paper and the report have made our job easier.
ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 38, at §§ 1195-1200.
41. Seeid at§ 1196.
42. See id at §§ 1197-1198. On these last two points, see also H. TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2-14, 142-60 (1979); Orban, ProductsLiability. .4 Comparative
LegalRestatement-Foreign NationalLaw and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. I NT'L & COMP. L.
342, 342-43 (1978).
43.

European Convention on Products Liability in' Regard to Personal Injury and

Death, Jan. 27, 1977, 1977 Europ. T.S. No. 91, reprinted in 16 1.L.M. 7 (1977). For a discussion of the substance of the convention, see Hanotiau, The Councilo/Europe Convention on
Products Liability, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (1978).
44. Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective
products, 19 OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITY 9 (1976).
45. See LAW COMM'N No. 64, supra note 1, at 23-44. See also Mountstephen, supra
note 38, at 241-42.
46.

See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMM. ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, LIABILITY

FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS, 50th Report, §§ 56-57, at XIX-XX (1980). The Lords expressed
skepticism about the idea of adopting a uniform European strict liability standard in the
products area:
The Committee points out that, while the Directive is in course of negotiation, it

will be impossible for any Member State to ratify the Convention, since during that
time it cannot be known whether the two documents will be compatible; that negotiations will take several years; and that consequently the result of the proposal for
a Director must be to cause a long delay in the introduction of a regime of strict

liability for products.
Id
The Committee concludes its report in this vein:

"The Committee considers that the

amended draft Directive raises important matters of policy and principle and they recommend this Report to the House for Debate." Id
47. See, e.g., Orban, supra note 42, at 342-44, 346-58. See generally ASSOCIATION
EUROPtENE:

IETUDES JURIDIQUES ET FISCALES, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE (1975)
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English courts have relied upon a more traditional tort formula in
making liability determinations in this type of litigation. Although
contemporary judicial opinions raise some questions as to what the
traditional doctrine means in actual litigation, the landmark decision in this area, rendered to lessen the inequities arising from the
application of the privity rule in contracts law, has sanctioned the
use of a negligence formula to make liability determinations. The
landmark decision and its progeny, however, have given rise to
some acute doctrinal problems: What constitutes reasonable conduct? Who should bear the burden of proof? How stringent an evidentiary burden should be imposed?
B.

ContractualRemedies

Under English law,4 8 a party who is injured as a result of a
defect in a product has a number of remedial options in seeking
compensation for his injury. 49 The injured party may invoke a contractual theory of liability and bring an action against the other
party for breach of contract.50 In English law, the contractual remedies available under the common law in the products liability context have been supplemented and defined precisely by statute. The
Sale of Goods Act of 1979 provides that a sales contract contains an
implied term of merchantable quality regarding the product sold.5 '
[hereinafter cited as PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE]; G. PETITPIERRE, LA RESPONSABILITt
DU FAIT DES PRODUITS (1974); Davis, ProductsLiability in South African Law, 12 COMP. &
INT'L L. S. AFR. 206 (1979). For a discussion of products liability in a national, European,
and transnational context, see generally Tebbens, Western European Private International
Law and the Hague Convention Relating to ProductLiability in 2 HAGUE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 3
(1978); PRODUCT LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE, SCIENCE (P. Rheingold & S. Birnbaum 2d ed.
1975). See also THE RESEARCH GROUP, FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON PRODUCT LIABILITY
(1977) [hereinafter cited as FIRST CONGRESS].
48. For a comprehensive discussion of English tort law, including product liability, see
CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS (A. Armitage & R. Dias 14th ed. 1975); CHARLESWORTH ON
TORTS (R. Percy 6th ed. 1977); T. WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT (4th ed. 1979). See also R.
DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION
(1976); M. MILLNER, NEGLIGENCE IN MODERN LAW (1967).
49. For this description of the English law, the author has relied upon a number of
sources and summarized the data contained in these studies for purposes of the present
article. See LAW COMM'N No. 64, supra note 1, at 16-22; TEBBENS, supra note 42, at 45-57;
Paine, England, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 101-15. See also
Tobin, ProductsLiability: A4 United States Commonwealth ComparativeSurvey, 3 N.Z.U.L.
REV. 377 (1969).
50. See TEBBENS, supra note 42, at 45-47.
51. See generally Conway, The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. How Far
Consumer Protection?, NEW. L.J. 589 (1974); Vitoria, Statutes Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977, 41 MOD. L. REV. 312 (1978); Jolowicz, The Protectionof the Consumer and Purchaser
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Under the theory of implied contractual terms, when the buyer uses
a product in the way it was intended to be used and is injured because of a defect in the product, the product is clearly unfit for its
usual purpose. The seller has breached the implied term of merchantable quality and is liable for damages. The buyer need not
establish that the seller was somehow careless or otherwise negligent
in selling the product; he need only prove that a defect existed and
caused his injury. 52 Reasoning by analogy to tort concepts, the effect of this contractual doctrine and the implied terms made
mandatory by statute is to impose a form of strict liability upon the
seller. The injured buyer is not required to prove wrongful conduct
on the part of the seller leading to the breach, but rather he need
only prove: 1) that the product had a defect when it was sold;
intended use; and
2) that the product was used properly for its
53
3) that the defect was the cause of his injury.
At first blush, these contractual remedies appear to offer injured
consumers a satisfactory legal theory and mechanism by which to
resolve their grievances. In actual practice, however, this remedial
framework suffers rather severe limitations. Under the privity requirement, such contractual remedies can be invoked only by a contracting party.5 4 Consequently, an action based upon the implied
term of merchantable quality is available only against the seller, i.e.,
the buyer can sue the retailer of the product and not the manufacturer. Moreover, the action can be brought only by the buyer. 55
There is substantial reluctance in England to modify the privity requirement because of the fundamental rule of English contract law
that consideration must flow from the promisee. 56 While there is
some recognition in England that the legal remedies available to
parties injured as a result of defective products should be modified,
it is thought that the modernization of English law in this area
should not be affected by changing a fundamental rule of contract
law. The proposals advocating change have been directed toward
of Goods Under English Law, 32 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1969); Waddams, The Strict Liability of
Suppliers of Goods, 37 MOD. L. REV. 154 (1974); Wittenbort, ProductsLiability and the English Implied Terms Bill: Transatlantic Variations on a Theme, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185
(1973); Yates, The Supply of Goods Implied Terms Act 1973, 17 J. Bus. L. 135 (1973).
52. See generallysupra notes 50-51 and authorities cited therein.
53. See id
54. See generally TEBBENS, supra note 42, at 45-47 and authorities cited therein.
55. See id
56. See id
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the law of torts. 57
C

Tort Theories of Liability

The tort doctrine relating to the English law of products liability is entirely a judicial creation. Its development, divided essentially into two phases, can be traced through a relatively small
corpus of landmark case law illustrating the persistent reluctance of
English courts to deploy a strict liability concept in the products
context.
In a number of early cases, courts interpreted the privity-ofcontract rule as a limitation upon the injured plaintiff's right to inyoke remedies based upon theories in tort. Winterbottom v.
Wright ,5s decided in 1842, is the classic decision in this area and is
followed by an impressive progeny. 59 In Winterbottom, the plaintiff,
a coachman, was severely injured when the axle of the coach he was
driving broke. He brought an action against the maker of the coach,
alleging both a failure to perform and negligent conduct on the part
of the defendant. The defendant had contracted with a third party
to keep the coach in a proper state of repair. 60 The court, apparently
sensitive to the need to place limitations upon the liability of manufacturers in the context of developing industries, held for the defendant, reasoning that the maker of the coach owed no duty to the
plaintiff. Lord Abinger characterized the concerns and reasoning of
the court:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach,
might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the
most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
1
limit, would ensue. 6
In Winterbottom, the court declared that the manufacturer of a
defective product owed a legal duty only to parties who were in con57. See id
58. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. D. 1892).
59. See, e.g., Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Ex. 761, 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (1851); George v.
Skivington, 5 L.R.-Ex. 1 (1869); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883); Earl v. Lubbock, [1905] 1 K.B. 253; Blacker v. Lake & Elliot Ltd., 106 L.T.R. (n.s.) 533 (K.B. 1912);

Bates v. Batey & Co., [1913] 3 K.B. 351.
60. 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
61. Id
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tractual privity with him. The decision stood as authority for the
celebrated maxim "no privity, no liability." In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Winterbottom decision prevented the recovery in tort for non-buyers of the product unless the plaintiff
could establish fraud on the part of the defendant. Otherwise, tort
theories of liability could be invoked only in cases involving inher62
ently dangerous goods, a restrictive class of products.
D.

The Donoghue Rule

The doctrine articulated in Winterbottom and applied by its
progeny throughout the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries63 was eventually overruled in subsequent litigation.
More contemporary courts articulated the social policy views of the
day, views which had become more sensitive to the plight of injured
consumers.
Despite the doctrinal advance made in the landmark decision
of Donoghue v. Stevenson," English courts still resisted the concept
of strict liability to resolve products disputes. In Donoghue, a Scottish case decided in 1932, the plaintiff went to a cafd with a friend
who purchased a bottle of ginger-beer for her. After drinking some
of the beer, the plaintiff discovered a snail in the bottle. She did not
discover the snail before drinking the beer because of the opacity of
the glass bottle. As a result of drinking the beer, the plaintiff became ill. Mrs. Donoghue filed an action for damages against Mr.
Stevenson, the manufacturer of the beer, claiming that the defend65
ant was negligent in placing his product on the market.
The circumstances of the case obliged the court to address the
same issue that had been brought before the Winterbottom court,
namely, whether the defendant-manufacturer owed any duty of care
to the ultimate consumer with whom he had no contractual relationship. The Donoghue case went before the House of Lords on appeal. A majority determined that the plaintiffs theory for relief was
legally sound, provided she could prove the facts alleged. 66 The
holding established what became known as the "manufacturer prin62. See TEBBENS, supra note 42, at 50.
63. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 48, at § 510.

64. 1932 A.C. 562. See also Heuston, Donoghue v. Stevenson in Retrospect, 20 MOD.
L. REv. I (1957).

65. 1932 A.C. at 563.
66. Id at 605, 622-23.
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ciple, ' ' 67 namely, that manufacturers owe a duty of due care in the

manufacture of their products to the ultimate consumers of their
products. 68 According to the language of the court,
[t]he manufacturer of an article of drink sold by him to a distributor, in circumstances which prevent the distributor or the ultimate purchaser or consumer from discovering by inspection any
defect, is under [a] legal duty to the ultimate purchaser or conthe article is free from defect
sumer to take reasonable care that
69
likely to cause injury to health.
Lord Atkin's speech in Donoghue made clear that the privity rule in
contract would not defeat a party's claim in tort.
The legal duty imposed was defined according to a negligence
and reasonable care formulation, and was owed to all foreseeable

plaintiffs:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you
must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who
is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in
law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons who are
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably
to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
directing my
70
question.

In a word, the Donoghue decision unequivocally established
that an injured consumer had the right to bring a tort action against

the manufacturer of a defective product.7 ' Despite the fact that the
manufacturer owed a contractual duty only to the wholesaler or retailer of the product, the scope of his duty in tort was not circumscribed by the privity rule in contract. The Donoghue court made

clear that the duty of reasonable care in tort was independent of
contractual obligations owed to consumers. While this doctrine represented a considerable advance over previous English jurisprudence in the products area, the court did not espouse a strict liability

rule. Instead, the court provided only that manufacturers could be
held liable for the negligent manufacture of their products when the
67.
68.

CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 48, at § 882.
Id at §511.

69. 1932 A.C. at 578-79 (text of speech by Lord Atkin).
70. Id at 580.
71. See generally TEBBENS, supra note 42, at 51.
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products were defective and caused injury as a result of this
negligence.
E. The Donoghue Negligence Analysis
To establish a cause of action in tort under the Donoghue analysis, the injured plaintiff-consumer had to satisfy a number of requirements. 72 First, the alleged defect in the product must have been
a defect capable of causing injury to the plaintiffs physical wellbeing or property. Second, the defect must have existed at the time
the product left the manufacturer's possession. Third, the defect
must not have been the type of defect which the manufacturer reasonably could expect either the consumer or another third party to
notice and correct before it could do any harm. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the plaintiff was required to establish that
the existence of the defect was attributable to the manufacturer's
lack of reasonable care. 73
The fourth requirement of Donoghue places all English products liability litigation squarely within a traditional negligence standard, imposing the usual burden upon the plaintiff to prove a
deviation by the defendant from the ordinary standard of care. In
this context, the evidentiary burden is more onerous upon plaintiffs
given the highly technical determinations that they may need to
make and the fact that the manufacturing process is under the control of, and more familiar to, the defendant. It seems that the defendant-manufacturer would be in a better position to assume the
burden of proof in these circumstances.
F The Daniels Interpretation
The outcome in the well-known case of Daniels and Daniels v.
R. White & Sons Ltd., and Tarbard74 illustrates the inequities to
which the application of an ordinary negligence analysis can give
rise in the special circumstances of products litigation. In Daniels,
the plaintiff purchased a bottle of lemonade from a retailer. Both he
and his wife drank from it and became ill. The product contained
carbolic acid, a poisonous disinfectant. The husband's breach of
72. See, e.g., Paine, supra note 49, at 101.
73. See id
74. [1938] 4 All E.R. 258 (K.B.). For a discussion of this case, see Diamond, European
Product Liability Developments: European Product Liability Developments Other than the
EEC (ProductLiability-An English View), in FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 47, at 229, 233.
See also CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 48, at § 511.
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contract action against the retailer was successful. The wife, however, could not bring an action based upon contract theory; she had
not been a contracting party and therefore lacked privity. Accordingly, she invoked a theory of tort liability, claiming that the presbottle was due to the
ence of the carbolic acid in the lemonade
75
negligence of the defendant-manufacturer.
At trial, the wife established a sufficient causal link between the
product and her injuries to cause a shifting of the burden of proof.
The court required the manufacturer to prove that the injury did not
occur as a result of his negligence. Using expert testimony, however, the manufacturer established that he had recently installed
what was described as a fool-proof system for cleaning, washing,
and filling bottles in his plant.76 Upon the basis of this evidence, the
court dismissed the negligence action against the manufacturer.
The court reasoned that while the defendant-manufacturer had a
legal duty to be careful in the manufacture of his product, he was
not required to be infallible:
[i]t seems to me a little difficult to say that, if people supply a
fool-proof method of cleaning, washing and filling bottles, they
have not taken all reasonable care to prevent defects in their
commodity. . . . [T]he plaintiffs . . . have entirely failed to
prove to my satisfaction that the defendant company were guilty
of a breach of their duty towards the plaintiffs. .... 77
G. An Assessment of Donoghue and Daniels
The Donoghue and Daniels decisions are representative of the
current status of English law. Donoghue unquestionably reflects a
progression over previous doctrine: it provides injured consumers
with a remedy in tort against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product despite the lack of privity. Taken together, however,
these decisions also make clear that English courts have refused to
incorporate a strict liability rule into their products jurisprudence,
maintaining what appears to be a rather conservative and traditional doctrinal posture.
In most industrialized countries today, it seems that tort liability determinations are no longer centered upon questions of blameworthiness and fault, but instead upon the more neutral question of
75. [1938] 4 All E.R. at 259.
76. Id at 261-62.
77. Id at 262-63.
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which party is in the best position to assume the cost of risk and
distribute these costs to the public. Tort law has ceased to have a
primarily punitive function and instead has become a mechanism
for compensating accident victims. Considering these developments, one wonders whether Donoghue should still be controlling in
England; whether the English courts' attachment to fault-based liability determinations is not atavistic.
H

The Impact of Presumptionsof Negligence

Such considerations have not persuaded English courts to
adopt a strict liability rule as part of their jurisprudence in the products area. Some English courts and commentators maintain that the
incorporation of the strict liability rule would not only unduly minimize the role of fault in tort liability determinations, but would also
be unnecessary since the negligence formula articulated in Donoghue has the practical effect of a strict liability rule. Accordingly,
the special characteristics of products litigation transform the implications and impact of a traditional negligence analysis. The plaintifis burden of proof, for example, is considerably more limited
than it appears initially; the application of a negligence formula
leads, it seems, to the imposition of a strict legal duty in the special
context of these cases. Proof of the existence of a defect, it is argued,
creates an almost automatic presumption of negligence on the man7
ufacturers' part which they must rebut in order to avoid liability. 8
Donoghue did not declare a strict liability rule. It did, however,
take an intermediary position between negligence and strict liability
in products cases, akin to the classical res ipsa loquitur doctrine 79 or
the liability
theory articulated in article 1384(1) of the French Code
Civil.80
Part of the Daniels case illustrates this argument. There, the
fact that the plaintiff established the existence of a defect and resulting injury was sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant-manufacturer to prove that he was not negligent in the manufacture of the
product. In other words, although the doctrine applying to products
cases is stated in terms of negligence, in actual practice, it seems that
78. For a discussion of this point, see Diamond, supra note 74, at 231; Paine, supra
note 49, at 106. See also MILLNER, supra note 48, at 89-93.

79. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note. 74, at 231.
80. For a thorough discussion of this form of liability by a distinguished torts scholar,
see generally Stone, LiabilityforDamages Causedby Things, in XI I' 'L ENCY. COMP. L., at
ch. 5 (1973).
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the applicable theory is a flexible res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Once
the plaintiff establishes a defect and resulting injury, the defendants
must rebut the presumption that they were negligent in manufacturing the product. Moreover, it appears that the plaintiff has all the
advantages of a res ipsa loquitur formulation without being saddled
with any of its inconveniences, i.e., he need not satisfy the formal
requirements for the application of the doctrine. 8' It seems, however, that other Donoghue elements for establishing a cause of action in tort against a manufacturer closely parallel the formal
requirements for invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The other part of Daniels stands for an entirely different proposition. It illustrates the problems associated with the use of a negligence analysis in a products liability context. The defendant in
Daniels established through expert testimony that he had a foolproof system which would preclude the type of defect of which the
plaintiff complained. According to the defendant, he could not explain how the carbolic acid had been introduced into the lemonade
bottle; his processing techniques could not allow for such an occurrence. Upon the basis of this evidence, the court held for the defendant, reasoning that he had taken all the care that a reasonable
person would have taken in manufacturing the product. Despite
proof that the product was dangerously defective, the injured plaintiff was denied recovery because she failed to establish the defendant's negligence.
The Daniels result attests to the fact that the Donoghue approach does not amount to a strict liability rule. If Daniels is at all
typical of English products liability cases, the creation of a presumption of negligence merely adds additional perfunctory stages to an
already complex litigation procedure. The plaintiff establishes the
existence of a defect in the product which caused him injury; the
defendant, then, is required to prove that the defect was not attributable to his negligence. The manufacturer satisfies his burden by
producing evidence which shows how careful he was in making his
product. If the defendant's evidence is not dispositive, the burden
once against shifts to the plaintiff to contest the allegation of reasonable conduct, a burden which requires him to gain a thorough
knowledge of the manufacturing process and a concomitant ability
to locate the substandard conduct in perhaps a vast and highly technical process.
81.

The authors are indebted to Professor Vernon Palmer for this point.
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I The Role of a Modified "Res Ipsa" Formula
If the modified res ipsa adjunct to the Donoghue negligence formulation is to be looked upon as the English courts' subtle way of
introducing a strict liability rule in the products liability context,
that effort should be viewed as a failed experiment. It seems that
when the res ipsa doctrine is applied in this context, albeit in modified and more flexible form, it achieves none of its basic purposes. It
serves no ostensibly punitive function for acts which are manifestly
negligent in character since there are some substantial questions as
to what constitutes a defect and what sort of conduct can give rise to
an actionable claim. The evidentiary rationale for the doctrineplacing the burden of proof upon the party who has better access to
the information and documentation--comes to naught, since, once
the defendant describes and documents his careful conduct, the
plaintiff must challenge his allegations on technical grounds.
If a negligence-res ipsa analysis is to be retained in products
litigation, perhaps the defendant should be required to show not
only that he was careful, but also how the defect might not have
arisen given his precautions. Such an analytical framework would
amount to the adoption of a strict liability rule in all respects but in
name. According to Daniels, it seems that current English law still
is very far from adopting this type of negligence-res i9sa formulation. The so-called presumption of negligence, nowhere mandated
in the Donoghue opinion, can be easily rebutted by the use of general technical documentation which avoids the central issue. This
places the consumer at a unfair disadvantage and makes English
products liability law, with its apparently stubborn attachment to
fault-based liability determinations, retrogressive in relation to the
jurisprudence of other national jurisdictions.
J The Grant Decision
Other English cases, however, have unequivocally established
that the Donoghue negligence doctrine, regardless of how one interprets the presumption of negligence issue, may amount to the imposition of a defacto strict liability standard upon manufacturers. In
the well-known Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills case,8 2 the plaintiff
alleged that he contracted dermatitis from wearing the defendant's
underpants. The product allegedly contained an excessive amount
231;

82. 1936 A.C. 85 (P.C.). For a discussion of this case, see Diamond, supra note 74, at
LAW COMM'N No. 64, supra note 1, at 16; WEIR, supra note 48, at 21.
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of sulphites. The defendant denied that he had been negligent in
the manufacture of the product and introduced evidence establishing that he had manufactured nearly five million pairs of underpants without ever receiving a complaint from customers.8 3 The
court, however, held the defendant liable. In applying the Donoghue negligence rule, the court reasoned that the plaintiff need not
prove how the sulphites got into the product, but only establish that
they were in the product and caused his injury. The manufacturer,
then, was required to prove that he had not been negligent. Evidence indicating that the plaintiffs complaint was the first received
in a sale of nearly five million articles was insufficient to either disprove negligence or to establish that the defendant had taken reasonable care in the manufacture of his product.8 4
K.

The Burden of Prooffor Exculpating the Manufacturer

In Grant, the court followed basically the same procedural steps
as the Daniels court, but imposed a heavier burden of proof on manufacturers to rebut the presumption of negligence that had been created against them. It is characteristic of and perhaps endemic to the
use of a negligence analysis that the application and interpretation
of the standard of reasonable care varies from court to court even
when courts are confronted with very similar, if not identical, facts.
The Grant opinion is not focused on the procedural and substantive
impact of the modified res 6psa doctrine, but rather on the meaning
of reasonableness in the products liability setting. Specifically, it is
concerned with the relationship between reasonable conduct and the
presumption of negligence which arises from proof of a defect and
resulting injury.
The defendant-manufacturer's evidence in Grant strongly suggested that he was even more careful and prudent than his counterpart in Daniels. The defendant did not argue that his plant
contained a supposed fool-proof system of sanitation, but rather relied upon objective data-his safety record. Ironically, one court
exculpated the Daniels defendant upon evidence which merely suggested careful and prudent conduct, while the Grant court held the
defendant liable because of strong evidence that he was a careful
and reasonable manufacturer.
83. 1936 A.C. at 95.
84. Id at 96, 108.
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Grant and Daniels Compared

The Daniels and the Grant courts, although they applied the
same negligence test articulated in Donoghue, obviously had very
different conceptions of how the reasonable conduct requirement
should function. The Daniels court took the Donoghue negligence
requirement at face value and interpreted it to mean that although a
consumer may be injured by a defect in a product, manufacturers
will not be held liable if they establish either a general record of
safety and care or that their process does not usually give rise to
defects. One product out of one hundred thousand may be defective
and cause injury. This risk of accidents must fall upon buyers since
there is no legal basis upon which to premise liability upon a manufacturer-she was not unreasonable and, therefore, not at fault.
The Grant court advanced a radically different interpretation of
the concept of reasonable conduct and, concomitantly, the role of
the fault notion. It is an interpretation which seems to equate reasonable conduct on the manufacturer's part with an absolute legal
duty to guarantee that none of their products are defective. From
Grant to Daniels the focus and method of assessment changed completely. In Grant, the court's focus was not on conventional doctrinal implications of negligence, but rather on individual consumers
and the harm particular products caused them. Although the analytical standard is expressed in terms of reasonable conduct, it does
not matter whether the manufacturer was reasonable and careful. It
appears that Grant stands for the proposition that once the plaintiff
establishes that a product was defective and was the cause of his
injury, the manufacturer will be liable in tort despite strong proof
suggesting that he took reasonable care in the manufacture of his
product. The Grant court seems to have imposed a strict legal duty
upon the manufacturer to guarantee the consuming public that his
products will be free, in every case, from harmful defects.
Clearly, the Grant and Daniels interpretations of the Donoghue
rule radically differ. Moreover, although Grant was not, strictly
speaking, an English decision-it was a decision of the Privy Council with the same membership as the House of Lords-Danielswas a
decision of a judge of first instance. Technically, neither decision
binds the English High Court or any higher court, but Grant would
be a more persuasive precedent. While it is quite characteristic of
tort litigation that the same doctrine is interpreted differently by different courts in the context of similar, if not identical, cases, the di-
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chotomy of construction here is too fundamental to allow for
coexistence, peaceful or otherwise.
It is uncertain what the applicable doctrine means: Does it impose an ordinary duty of reasonable care upon the manufacturer or
is it merely a guise for a strict liability formulation which excludes
the notion of fault and, therefore, the concept of reasonable conduct? It could be argued that there is no real inconsistency between
the two interpretations because the Donoghue doctrine creates a presumption of negligence once the plaintiff establishes the existence of
a defect. The resulting shift in the burden of proof amounts to a
form of strict liability. As noted earlier, there are substantial
problems in characterizing and determining what this presumption
and shift in the burden of proof actually mean in both procedural
and substantive terms. Moreover, the reasoning of the Daniels court
is an illustration of the fact that any reasonableness standard that is
taken as a criterion in determining liability can be a far cry from a
strict liability rule. In the final analysis, the unavoidable conclusion
is that these two courts arrived at different results by deploying two
contradistinctive legal theories of tort liability. Daniels may be a
more accurate reflection of what the Donoghue doctrine intended to
articulate because it places primary emphasis upon the concept of
reasonableness in reaching a determination of liability. Grant disregards the negligence formulation in favor of a strict liability rule. In
this sense, it goes beyond Donoghue and may, perhaps should, stand
as precedent for how contemporary English courts should decide
products liability cases.
M

Hill: A ContemporaryAssessment of Donoghue

A recent case seems to confirm the view that the Grant decision
was the dispositive interpretation of the Donoghue doctrine. In Hill
v. James Crowe (Cases) Ltd ,85 the plaintiff, a driver of a van, was
injured when a wooden case he was standing on collapsed. The
plaintiff established that the wooden case had caved in because it
had been badly nailed together. In an action against the manufacturer of the case, the plaintiff contended that the defendant owed a
duty of care to those persons who were likely to come in contact
with the case to make it strong enough to withstand the foreseeable
hazards of its journey. The plaintiff alleged that one foreseeable
hazard was that someone would stand on the case. In using an in85. [1978] 1 All E.R. 812 (Q.B. 1977).
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sufficient number of nails, the manufacturer had breached his duty
86
of reasonable care.
The defendant-manufacturer introduced evidence indicating
that: 1) the standards of workmanship and supervision in his factory were high, 2) that during his fourteen years of business he had
never received a complaint of this kind, and 3) that given the manufacturing process, it was very unlikely that an accident of this type
would happen. As a consequence, the manufacturer contended that
he had not breached his duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff.8 7
The court, however, held against the defendant. It ruled that this
case came with the Donoghue rule and that the manufacturer's allegation that his manufacturing process consisted of supervised high
quality workmanship was not a defense to the negligence claim. 88
The court concluded that since the plaintiff's injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the manufacturer's faulty workmanship, the defendant was liable in negligence for plaintiff's
injury. The court expressly refused to follow the precedent set in
Daniels, characterizing it as a criticized opinion and inferring that it
was an unstable precedent. 89 In the court's estimation, the dismissal
of the negligence claim in Daniels was not justified:
The manufacturer's liability in negligence did not depend on
proof that he had either a bad system of work or that his supervision was inadequate. He might also be vicariously liable for the
negligence of his workmen in the course of their employment. If
the plaintiff's injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of such negligence, the manufacturer's liability would be established under Donoghue v. Stevenson. 90
The Hill opinion makes clear that the Grant construction of the
Donoghue doctrine is the more persuasive interpretation of that
case. It appears to be the controlling opinion among contemporary
courts. Although Hill speaks in terms of a standard of reasonable
care, it seems that the defendant's defense concerning his conduct is
of little moment in assessing the liability question. Rather, the
court's analysis focuses on the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff estab86. Id at 813.
87. Id at 815.
88. Id at 815-16.
89. Id at 816.
90. Id This view of the Donoghue opinion is also confirmed by the recent House of
Lords decision in Tumor Books, Ltd v. The Veitchi Co., in which the duty of care was
extended to cover financial losses. See THE TIMEs (London), July 17, 1982 (Law Report).
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lishes that the product he purchased was defective and caused his
injury, the question becomes whether the defect and the resulting
injury were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence
of the manufacturer or his employees (for whom the manufacturer
is vicariously liable).
Under this reasoning, any claim by the plaintiff that the defect
arose as a result of faulty workmanship, in light of the circumstances of mass production, will appear to be plausible. No matter
how well-qualified or how stringently supervised workers are, and
despite a previously flawless company record, workers, it can be assumed, are likely to commit errors. In these circumstances, the entire negligence analysis functions in form only as a label upon which
to map out the stages of a reasoning with a pre-determined result.
This result has nothing to do with the question of reasonable conduct. Once the theory of vicarious liability is introduced into the
analysis, the requirement that the injury be a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the manufacturer's negligence becomes no more
than a straw requirement. The existence of a defect, in effect, presupposes some error in the manufacturing process. While the manufacturing process may be perfect in mechanical terms, it includes a
human component which may err. The most plausible explanation
for the existence of a defect lies in the human element for which the
manufacturer can be held legally liable. It is no more than an
empty formality to ask whether the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable consequence of this hypothetical negligence.
The Hill court goes through the motions of deploying a negligence analysis and never refers to policy considerations which could
support the imposition of a strict legal duty. It appears manifest,
however, that the court is introducing-surreptitiously but unmistakably-a strict liability rule under the guise of the negligence
analysis consecrated by Donoghue.
N. The Impact of Hill and Grant
Under Hill and Grant, once the plaintiff establishes that he was
injured as a result of a defect in a product, the litigation need not go
any further: the existence of a defect points to "negligent" conduct
on the part of the manufacturer. The existence of a defect, then,
does not merely create a presumption of negligence, but is fully dispositive of the negligence issue and the liability question. Despite
the evident contradiction in such a statement, it can be said that,
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under the doctrine articulated in Hill, regardless of the manufacturer's care, the existence of a defect in a product indicates wrongful, substandard, and unreasonable conduct. Arguably, under the
Hill and Grant analyses, English courts no longer are required to
take seriously the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
conduct; liability determinations will not be premised upon the notion of fault or wrongful conduct. Rather, current English products
liability doctrine unequivocally requires that manufacturers produce defect-free products or bear the financial consequences for injuries which result from the existence of rare and probably
unavoidable defects in their products. Clearly, the applicable rule
does not emerge from a negligence analysis, but from strict liability
principles.
Under contemporary judicial interpretations, the Donoghue
negligence analysis had been made to address and voice policy considerations and choices which underlie the adoption of a strict liability rule in the products context. It seems that the Hill decision
acknowledges: 1) that risks are increasingly an inherent part of a
modem technological society, 2) that accidents will occur in this setting and leave its victims both physically and financially impaired,
and 3) that the nineteenth-century preoccupation with fault-based
liability determinations has little relevance in modem society. The
notion of legally wrongful conduct and blameworthiness has given
way to the culpability-free concept of compensating accident victims
in the most cost efficient manner for both economic and humanitarian motives. Tortfeasors now are actors upon a hazardous stage
where injuries are inevitable and unavoidable. Money judgments
no longer are seen as purely punitive measures, but rather as a way
to transfer wealth from one party who bears some relation, be it
proximate or otherwise, to the injury suffered by another party and
who has the better possibility of distributing the cost of the occurrence. In a society fully into its mass production era, there appears
to be no better way to interpret the notion of tortious liability in the
products area except to rid it of its antiquated culpability base.
Moreover, given the technical and sometimes inexplicable character
of some occurrences, the notion of fault appears to be totally unsatisfactory and unworkable with regard to products litigation.
0.

Other Defensesfor the Manufacturer

The other grounds under the Donoghue analysis upon which
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manufacturers can rely to exculpate themselves do not give rise to
such extensive analytical difficulties as the primary grounds for the
imposition of liability. They merit only a brief reference. First, the
probability of an intermediate examination of the product may relieve the manufacturer of his "duty of care" to the plaintiff-consumer. 9' It should be noted that the mere possibility of such an
examination will not relieve the defendant of his duty. Such an examination must be within the contemplation of the parties as a
likely event. 92 The test established by the courts to decide this question is whether a reasonable person would anticipate an examination which would avoid injury to the user. The probability of an
intermediate examination again is determined by reference to its
foreseeability. 93 When an examination is probable and actually
does take place, the manufacturer no longer is under the duty of
care prescribed by Donoghue. The courts have ruled, however, that
when there was no probability that an examination would take
still can be held
place, but one in fact took place, the manufacturer
94
liable for a breach of his duty of care.
The intermediate examination ground is only a limited ground
of exculpation. For example, in the event that an intermediate
dealer discovers a defect in the manufacturer's product and fails to
remedy the situation, the manufacturer, in addition to the negligent
dealer, is liable to the consumer.95 This type of subsequent negligence by another party in the chain of distribution will relieve the
manufacturer of liability only if it was clear, either expressly or impliedly, that the product was not to be used without first being examined or tested by an intermediate party. Moreover, even when
the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, the manufacturer may not be
relieved of liability. 96 A consumer may discover a defect in the
product, but use it nonetheless. Such knowing conduct will not necessarily bar the plaintiff's recovery, provided that 97it was reasonable
for him to take the risk under the circumstances.
Second, the manufacturer will not be held liable when the
91.

See LAW COMM'N No. 64, supra note 1, at 16-18; CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note

48, at §§ 512-520.
92.

See generally supra note 91 and authorities cited therein.

93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id
96. Id

97. Id
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product was not dangerous when it left his possession and he had no
reason to anticipate that it would become dangerous. 98 Third, the
liability rule applies only to physical injury to persons and/or property and does not cover purely pecuniary loss. 99 Fourth, the manufacturer will not be held liable for injury resulting from a defect if
the product was used in a way inconsistent with its intended use.' 00
P. Possible Modications in the English Law
The doctrine articulated in Donoghue represents the controlling
English jurisprudence in the products liability area. This case established that, despite a lack of privity, an injured consumer still may
seek relief against the manufacturer of the product by invoking a
tort liability theory. The Donoghue court did not refer to strict liability principles, but rather established that future products litigation in tort would be resolved on the basis of a negligence analysis.
This analysis required that injured plaintiffs not only establish the
existence of a defect, but also prove that the defect was the result of
unreasonable conduct by the manufacturer.
Subsequent courts have given a variety of interpretations to the
reasonable conduct requirement of the Donoghue negligence analysis. While one early court appears to have applied the reasonable
conduct concept quite literally-making it a serious exculpatory factor for the manufacturer despite any presumptions that may be created in favor of the plaintiff's action-a more contemporary court
seems to have translated the Donoghue rule into a strict liability
principle by making the defendant's burden of proof nearly impossible to satisfy once the plaintiff establishes the existence of a defect.
The uncertainty these inconsistent holdings create in English
products liability law needs to be rectified. There appears to be no
imperative mandating that negligence language be maintained
while a strict legal duty is imposed upon manufacturers. The aim of
articulating a legal doctrine which is at once consistent and predictable would best be served by explicitly stating that manufacturers
will be held strictly liable for injuries which result from defects in
their products. A choice, with its attendant general societal implications, needs to be made about whether the loss associated with such
injury should be borne by the injured party or be transferred to the
98. Id

99. Id
100. Id
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manufacturer of the product. Numerous considerations-the development of the law in other national jurisdictions, the recommendations of the EEC Draft Directive, and the basic conditions of
modem technological society and mass production--call for eliminating the fault notion in the products area. In all likelihood, the
use of a fault notion as a basis for the imposition of liability would
pose difficult definitional and analytical problems and lead to arbitrary results perhaps incapable of reconciliation. Retaining a negligence standard and simply shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant upon the plaintiff's satisfaction of basic evidentiary requirements would probably be ineffective in most cases and represent but a perfunctory measure which simply postpones the ultimate
resolution of the dispute. After all, under a negligence analysis,
neither party in these situations may be at fault in the classical
sense. The manufacturer may have done all that was humanly possible to avoid dangerous defects, and the consumer may have reasonably used the product for its intended use. Under such
circumstances, according to the conventional negligence analysis
based upon fault and reasonable conduct, the defendant-manufacturer should not be held liable because in the final analysis, he did
nothing wrong.
The veritable ends of justice as expressed through notions of
equity and societal consensus, and even common sense, may not be
achieved under the application of this traditional theory of tort liability. Of the two parties involved, the plaintiff needs to be compensated for the losses he suffered occasioned by the accident. The very
existence of a defect suggests a certain amount of fault on the part of
the manufacturer, no matter how slight and perhaps insufficient it is
to characterize the conduct as socially substandard. The manufacturer clearly is in the better position to insure himself against claims
arising from the use of his products and has the possibility of distributing the financial cost of these injuries to the consuming public
at large.
As noted earlier, the implied warranty of merchantable quality
creates a strict liability rule in contract, usually against the retailer
of the product. If Donoghue is to function effectively as a means
around the privity-of-contract rule, its modem construction should
provide injured parties who lack privity with the same type of remedy and relief that is available under a contracts theory. Additionally, much doctrinal clarity would be gained by not masking a strict
legal duty in the guise of a negligence analysis. Finally, and most
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importantly, there is a strong European trend, modeled to some extent upon United States products liability jurisprudence and attested
to by the Strasbourg Convention and the EEC Draft Directive
favoring the adoption of a strict liability principle as the community
law.
The need to foster a strong European community by achieving
the harmonization and modernization of national laws is perhaps
the greatest incentive to have England modify the Donoghue doctrine to have it reflect what some contemporary courts have interpreted it to mean within the context of late twentieth century
society. Given the relative statistical insignificance of products litigation in England, the doctrinal clarity that could be gained in the
national law by articulating an unambiguous standard of liability,
and the intractable conflicts problems that could arise as a result of
maintaining an isolated and antiquated national rule of liability,
there is little that should stand in the way-save a stubborn and
perhaps unjustifiable clinging to the would-be purity of past legal
doctrine---of the English adoption of what appears to be the EEC
consensus in this area.
IV.

EXPERIMENTATION WITH CIVIL LAW CONCEPTS
IN LOUISIANA

From a strictly conceptual perspective, the contrast between the
American and English positions on products liability is indeed considerable. Its analogue in Louisiana law provides an interesting
point of reference by which to highlight the comparison between
these dichotomous doctrinal positions. The courts in Louisiana undoubtedly will pay unofficial heed to developments in other United
States' jurisdictions and attempt to align their determinations along
a standard which mirrors the essential dictates of section 402A. In
addition, these courts must take into account the delictual liability
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, some of which evidence a
liability potential which may exceed that advanced in the Restatement. In this sense, the Louisiana decisional law has articulated the
logical culmination of an absolute duty in the products context. Unfortunately, to use Justice Holmes' celebrated maxim, the "experience" of the law in this area has led to a recent judicial and the
possibility of a future legislative reconsideration of the meaning of
strict products liability in Louisiana. Rather than continuing its elucidation of the significance of the Greenman rationale which under-
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pins the Restatement provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
retreated to a liability position which characterizes the fault-based
orientation of the English courts. Proposals are being drafted to
have the legislature ratify this "about-face" in a revised statute.
While the EEC hopes to harmonize European law on products liability by adopting a strict liability rule, the American jurisdiction
with possibly the most advanced application of an absolute standard
appears to be sounding the retreat to a negligence rule, seeing this
retrogression as an appropriate response to the products liability crisis generated by the 402A language. Some of the political and practical difficulties which surround the adoption of the EEC Draft
Directive, then, are also present in the United States.
A.

The Applicable Law in Louisiana

The expansion of the doctrinal foundations of products liability
law in Louisiana is of fairly recent origin. Due to the generalized
nature of the relevant Civil Code articles,' 0 ' much of the development of the applicable theory has been jurisprudential. Prior to
1971, the theories of liability available to injured plaintiffs were
quite limited. A plaintiff could bring a tort action premised upon
negligence under Civil Code article 2315.102 In such a case, the
plaintiff also could argue for application of res ipsa loquitur in order
to lessen his burden of proof, provided the requisites of the doctrine
were met. 10 3 Under the same code provision and in keeping with
other United States' jurisdictions, the courts allowed consumers who
were injured by deleterious foodstuffs and defective bodily products
to directly sue a manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of
wholesomeness.'14 A conclusive presumption that the manufacturer
knew of the defects in his product was routinely invoked, thereby
relieving the consumer of his burden of proving a manufacturer's
101.

LA. CiV.

CODE ANN.

arts. 2315, 2317, 2475, 2545 (West 1977). For an excellent

discussion of tort law in Louisiana, see F. STONE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT
DOCTRINE (1977). For a recent commentary on Louisiana products liability, see Palmer, In
Quest of a Strict Liability Under the Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1317 (1982).
102. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1982).

103. Res ipsa loquitur, a common law doctrine, has been grafted onto article 2315 by
the Louisiana courts. See Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir.
1969). See also Houston-New Orleans, Inc. v. Page Eng'g Co., 353 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. La.
1972) (applying Texas law).
104. See LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873
(1952) (soft drinks); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963)

(cigarettes).
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negligence. 0 5 Early courts were reluctant, however, to expand the
strict liability notion based on an implied warranty in tort beyond
the "bodily use" products.' 0 6
A third ground for imposing liability was available under Civil
Code articles 2531 and 2545, contractual articles warranting a product against redhibitory defects. 10 7 This potential source of redress
for injured consumers was based upon the redhibition articles found
in Book III, Title VII, Of Sale. 08 The warranty obligations included warranty of merchantable title 0 9 and warranty of reasonable
fitness for intended use."10 Originally, recovery was restricted to
purchasers who were in privity with the vendor of the defective
product. The damages available were limited to the restoration of
price and expenses of the sale in the case of a good faith seller."' A
bad faith seller also could be held liable for damages; to justify labeling a vendor as one in "bad faith," however, a purchaser needed
to prove the seller's actual or imputed knowledge of the defect." 2 A
restrictive reading of the redhibition articles left a consumer, who
was not the purchaser, without recourse and exculpated a manufacturer, who was not the immediate vendor, from contractual liability.
The same code provisions dealing with delictual liability that,
prior to 1971, were utilized to limit the plaintiff's recovery were later
reinterpreted to allow for more frequent recovery. In Louisiana,
Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 have been deemed to be the
105. Robertson, Manufacturer'sLiabilityfor Defective Products in Louisiana Law, 50
TUL. L. REV. 50, 52 (1975-1976).

106.
Except in the food and drink cases ... the courts of this state have consistently rejected any deviation from the theory that Revised Civil Code Article
2317 must be read in connection with Revised Civil Code Articles 2315 and
2316 . ..
[Flault is a prequisite for recovery in suits sounding in tort ....
Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 338-39, 223 So. 2d 822, 825 (1969).
107. Louisiana Civil Code article 2545 permits a plaintiff to sue a "seller who knows
the vice of the thing he sells and omits to declare it" for restitution of the price, expenses and
damages. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West Supp. 1982). Louisiana Civil Code article
2531 permits recovery of the price and expenses of the sale against a good faith seller. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2531 (West Supp. 1982).
108. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2531 (asamended by La. 1974, No. 673, § 1), 2476, 2545
(West Supp. 1982).
109. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (West Supp. 1982). See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977)
(implied warranty of merchantibility).
110. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (West Supp. 1982). See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977)
(implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
111. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2531 (West Supp. 1982).
112. Id at art. 2545.
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"fountainhead" of tort liability." 13 These articles are the basic
source for determining when one person's conduct which does harm
to another is of such a nature that the actor must answer in damages. 1 14 Accordingly, "fault" is critical to a liability assessment. As
defined by Civil Code article 2316, fault includes willful, unlawful
conduct as well as imprudence or want of skill." 5 As interpreted by
the Louisiana courts, the concept of fault, however, has come to embody both traditional negligent and non-negligent injurious conduct-the latter being legally prohibited for reasons of social
policy." 6 As former Chief Justice Barham observed in Langlois v.
Allied Chemical,"I7 "[c]riminal laws, traffic regulations, zoning laws,
health laws, and others may and often do set the standard for lawful
conduct in personal relationships, although they are designed for
social protection .... ."118 Accordingly, legal liability under article
2315 may be premised either on negligence or social policy considerations which articulate acceptable standards of conduct. 19
This broad view of delictual fault-perhaps the most forthright
statement of the basis of tort liability other than the Andrews dissent
in Pa/sgraf-hashad a considerable impact upon the way in which
Louisiana courts have approached and resolved products liability
cases. In the celebrated Loescher v. Parr120 decision, Louisiana
Supreme Court Justice Tate declared that "liability arises from [a]
legal relationship to the person or thing whose conduct or defect creates an unreasonable risk of injuries to others."'' Therefore, once a
plaintiff proves that his injury resulted from a defective product
which was unreasonably dangerous, one need only find a legal relationship between various members in the chain of distribution in
order to impose liability.
113. Langlois v. Allied Chemicals Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1078, 249 So. 2d 133, 137
(1971). See also DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
114. Langlois, 258 La. at 1074, 249 So. 2d at 136 (citing DOMAT, CIVIL LAW IN ITS
NATURAL ORDER, Pt. 1, Book 2, Title 8, § 4, Art. I (Strahan trans., Cushing ed. 1861)).
115.
1982).

258 La. at 1075, 249 So. 2d at 136. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2316 (West Supp.

116. 258 La. at 1076, 249 So. 2d at 137. See Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 445 (La.
1975); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1971).
117.

258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).

118. 258 La. at 1067, 249 So. 2d at 137.
119. Id at 1077-78, 249 So. 2d at 137.
120. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
121. Id. at 446 (italics added).
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B. Landmark Products Cases
In the early 1970's, two Louisiana Supreme Court decisions significantly expanded the consumer protection rationale which underpinned redhibition and strict tort liability actions. Justice Tate's
landmark decision in Weber v. Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company of New York 122 changed the parameters of Louisiana products
liability law by imposing upon manufacturers a form of liability
functionally equivalent to that contained in section 402A-the rule
in many United States' common law jurisdictions. 23 In Weber, the
court held a manufacturer of cattle dip strictly liable for the loss of
cattle and the illness of plaintiff's sons which resulted from the use
of the product. 2 4 The court reasoned that a "manufacturer is presumed to know of the vices in the things he makes,"'' 2 5 and found
him to be at fault without requiring the plaintiff to establish
negligence:
A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury
to the user is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a
third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury
caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of
the article, 26 if the injury might reasonably have been
anticipated.
Accordingly, under the Weber doctrine, as in most United States'
jurisdictions adhering to a section 402A standard, the injured plaintiff must prove that 1) the product was defective, 2) it was unreasonably dangerous for normal use, and 3) his injuries were caused by
122. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
123. Section 402A provides in part:
Special Liability of Seller of Productfor Physical Harm to User or Consumer
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and,
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold;
2. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Robertson, supra note 105, at 50; See Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. La.
1980); Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980). The Weber court cites
both Greenman and Henningsen in support of its position. 250 So. 2d at 755-56.
124. "250 So. 2d at 758.
125. Id at 756.
126. Id at 755.
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the defect.
A strict application of Weber would require a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the product was "unreasonably dangerous," i.e.,
one "that a reasonable seller with knowledge of the defect would not

sell, or, alternatively, . . . one presenting risks greater than a rea-

sonable buyer would expect."' 128 As a result, and much like the section 402A standard upon which it appears to have been modeled,
the "unreasonably dangerous" component in Weber seems to superimpose a negligence formulation upon an ostensible standard of
strict liability. Accordingly, the two-fold requirement as to defectiveness appears to cause doctrinal and analytical confusion-the
same type of confusion which is current in many United States common law jurisdictions applying section 402A. This two-fold requirement, however, was largely ignored in Louisiana. The application
of the Weber analysis resulted invariably in consumer-oriented rul1 29
ings by Louisiana courts.

127. Proof of defectiveness can involve establishing the existence of either a manufacturing or design defect. The latter constitutes a more onerous burden for an injured consumer; it can involve an "indictment of conscious manufacturer choice" and a finding of
liability could have serious economic consequences on an entire industry. In most cases in
which plaintiffs have alleged a defect in design, Louisiana courts continue to demand a
specific showing of negligence. See ROBERTSON, supra note 105, at 65-66.
A discussion of what constitutes design defect may be found in Dean v. General Motors
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969). The court in Dean stressed that the reasonable care
standard would control and would be applied to facts known at the time the design was
adopted. Id at 192. In a more recent decision, the court stated that a manufacturer's liability may be limited insofar as "a manufacturer cannot be expected to design products with
component parts which will never wear out." Poland v. Beaird-Poulan, 483 F. Supp. at 1264
(citing Foster v. Marshall, 341 So. 2d 1354, 1361 (La. App. 1977)). See also McMorris v.
Insurance Co. of N.Am., 289 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 1973) (workman denied recovery for
failure to prove propane cylinder negligently designed); Bowen v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
273 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 1973) (manufacturer exonerated because mower not proved to be
improperly designed).
128. ROBERTSON, supra note 105, at 61. See also Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Charlie Hairston Aircraft, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 364 (W.D. La. 1978).
129. A plaintiff who is contributorily negligent is not necessarily barred from recovery.
Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981). This requirement has been construed narrowly
to bar recovery by a plaintiff who misuses the product. Avoyelles Country Club v. Walder
Kiddie & Co., 338 So. 2d 379, 382 (La. 1976). See also Christofferson v. Halliburton Co.,
617 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1980) (manufacturer not liable if product put to extraordinary use);
Bond v. Transairco, 514 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1975) (manufacturer not liable where purchaser
failed to follow maintenance schedule).
While causation has been the least litigated element of the Weber test, forseeability of
injury could be a more problematic determination. Although this negligence notion is seemingly at odds with a pristine theory of strict liability, the holdings of Weber and its progeny
have virtually written out the forsecability requirement from the liability calculus altogether.
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One year after Weber, the Louisiana Supreme Court again addressed the issue of manufacturer liability. While Weber was based
on a tort analysis, Media Production Consultants,Inc. v. MercedesBenz of North America, Inc. 130 was grounded on the redhibition articles.13 1 The court explicitly eliminated the privity requirement and
held that purchaser had an action in redhibition against all of the
vendor's ancestors in the chain of title. 132 Following the rationale of
Weber, the Media court announced that, in an action in redhibition,
a manufacturer of a defective product would be considered a bad
faith vendor since manufacturers are presumed to know of any defects in their products. 133 Their liability, therefore, would arise
under article 2545 and a consumer could recover not only for value
and expectation loss, but also for damages and reasonable attorney's
34

fees. 1

Although the Weber opinion did not actually mention the term "strict liability," it has been
viewed consistently as establishing "strict liability in tort ... against manufacturers for defects in their products." Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974). See Heirs of
Fruge v. Blood Services, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973).
130. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
131. Whereas Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. was technically a distributor,
rather than a manufacturer, the court found that based on the particular position held by
that company "the distributor occupied the position of a manufacturer." 262 So. 2d at 380.
132. Id at 381. See Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Reeves v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 370 So. 2d 202, 206 (La. App. 1979); Litvinoff, Manufacturer's Liabilityfor
Redhibitory Vices, 35 LA. L. REV. 310 (1975). Litvinoff argues that based on article 2476,
and possibly article 2503, a Louisiana purchaser has always possessed a cause of action
against his vendor's ancestors in title. See generally BAUDRY-LADANTIERIE & SAINAT,
TRATI THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL-DE LA VENTE ET DE L'ICHANGE 368-69
(2d ed. 1960); Huc, 10 COMMENTAIRE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 209 (1897).
133. 262 So. 2d at 377. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. article 2545 is based on spondetlperitiam
artis, the Roman maxim which expresses the presumption that a manufacturer knows the
defects of the things he makes. See 3 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 88 (Bugnet ed. 1861). See also
CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1645 (Fr.); Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977); Rey v.
Cuccia, 298 So. 2d at 845.
134. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2545, amended by Acts 1968 (West Supp. 1982). Subsequent cases have extended recovery against both manufacturers and retailers to bystanders
and other third persons. For example, in Ross v. John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d Il l
(5th Cir. 1972), the court held a vendor liable for the death of a child (a non-purchaser) who
was critically burned when her nightgown caught fire. The Ross court adopted the position
that "a defendant may not take refuge behind an apparently applicable code section just
because it does not specifically include the injured plaintiff's class." Id at 113. Citing Langlois, 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133, the court concluded that a third party may be owed the
same obligation as a purchaser. 464 F.2d at 113.
Two years later in the case of Hoffman v. All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d 388 (La. App.
1974), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 909 (La. 1976), the owner of a boat and his two companions
were injured when their boat nearly sank because of a defect in construction. The court
awarded the owner the value of the boat and granted both the owner and passengers dam-
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C. The Subsequent Development of a Sui Generis Theory of
ManufacturerLiability
In the last ten years, Louisiana courts have struggled with the
Weber and Media reasoning and, minimizing certain salient
problems of doctrine, have elaborated a hybrid products liability
analysis which merges tort and contractual theories of liability. This
sui generis theory of manufacturer liability results primarily from
three significant doctrinal permutations in the jurisprudence: 1) expansion of the definition of "manufacturer;" 2) modification of
plaintiff's burden of proving defectiveness; and 3) fusion of the tort
and redhibition theories of liability.
The term "manufacturer" has been extended to include professional vendors. 35 In Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck and Co. ,136 the
court held that "[t]he responsibility of Sears is the same as that of
the manufacturer" due to "the size, volume and merchandising
practices of Sears" and its capacity "for controlling the quality of its
merchandise . . . ." 137
The courts have also given an expansive definition to the term
"defect." The Weber analysis requires the plaintiff to prove that the
product was "defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use
....
,,138 To determine whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous," the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Hunt v. City Stores,
Inc. ,39 employed the celebrated Learned Hand balancing test normally used to make negligence determinations: "if the likelihood
and gravity of harm outweigh the benefits and utility of the manufactured product, the product is unreasonably dangerous.'1 4 Accordingly, if a product caused injury and was "unreasonably
ages for pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and loss of personal items based on LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. arts. 2475 and 2476. Id Although the Hoffman opinion lacks any doctrinal
analysis setting forth the reasons for awarding expectation damages to a non-purchaser, it
appears that Louisiana courts have opened wide the door for third-party recovery against
both manufacturers and vendors under the redhibition articles.
135. According to Professor Litvinoff, Media began the trend of applying spondetperitiam artis not only to manufacturers, but also to professional vendors. Manufacturer'sLiabiity, supra note 132, at 316.
136. 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
137. Id at 930. See Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 282 So. 2d 546 (La. App.
1973); Pennsylvania v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So. 2d 210 (La. App.), cert. denied, 251 La.
27, 202 So. 2d 649 (1967); Morrow, Warranty of Qualiy .A ComparativeSurvey, 14 TUL. L.
REV. 529, 539 (1940).
138. 259 La. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 755.
139. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).
140. Id. at 589.
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dangerous," a manufacturer could be held strictly liable. The Hunt
court, however, applied circuitous logic to arrive at its liability determination; it manipulated the negligence notion of "unreasonably
dangerous," virtually equating it with the happening of an unusual
occurrence, i.e., an injury. In affirming an earlier supreme court decision-the 1979 Marquez14 l decision-the court reversed the sequence of evidentiary elements of the Weber doctrine. Rather than
premise liability on the finding of a defect in a product which causes
injury, the court looked first to the victim's harm; from that, it inferred the existence of a defect.
Conceivably, under the Hunt reasoning, the occurrence of virtually any mishap--no matter how accidental--(here, a child's shoe
being caught in an escalator) would be enough of "an unusual occurrence" to raise an inference (possibly an irrebuttable presumption) that the product was "unreasonably dangerous."''

42

By

grafting a presumption of defectiveness in the law of strict liability
for manufacturers in a fashion reminiscent of the judicial application in common law jurisdictions of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
Louisiana courts virtually eliminated any need to prove defectiveness. The Hunt decision was a forceful example of how strongly
public policy considerations color and fix legal determinations in the
products area. Holding both the manufacturer and the store owner
liable in solido for the injuries sustained, the Hunt court reasoned:
"Otis [the manufacturer] is in a better position to improve the design
of the machine than City Stores [the store owner], but City Stores
should not be allowed to keep a defective escalator and pass all lia143
bility to the manufacturer."'

In keeping with and perhaps transcending the perspective
adopted in Escola and Greenman, Louisiana courts resolved the tension between doctrinal restraints and policy imperatives clearly in
favor of "powerless" consumers, in Justice Traylor's apt characteri141. Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979).
142. Id at 813. Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d at 588. A federal district court in
Louisiana had suggested a similar approach in 1972. In Houston-New Orleans Inc. v. Page
Eng'g Co., 353 F. Supp. 890, 895 (E.D. La. 1972), the court held that "a defect can be
inferred from unexplained occurrences." See Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 414 F.2d
682 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Vicknair v. T.L. James Co., 375 So. 2d 960 (La. App. 1979)

(fact that rim lock flew off when tire blew out was occurrence which would not have happened had rim lock not been defective). Accord Broussard v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins.
Co., 406 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1982); Goodlow v. City of Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305 (La.
App. 1981).
143. 387 So. 2d at 590.
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zation, to protect themselves against products which prove to be
"traps for the unwary."'"4 Implicitly but unmistakably, the Hunt
court incorporated into Louisiana jurisprudence the social insurance
rationale suggested by comment c to section 402A:
[Plublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products. . . be placed upon those who market them,
and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained .... [Tihe consumer ...is entitled to
the maximum protection at the hands of someone, and the45proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
In Philppe v. Browning Arms Company,' 46 the Louisiana
Supreme Court accomplished an explicit merger of tort and redhibition theories of recovery. Ignoring the great debate between the
Sealy and Santor courts and its implications, the highest Louisiana
court specifically declared that "[t]here is no compelling reason to
require a person injured by a defective product he has purchased to
proceed either in contract or in tort."' 47 In fact, under the Philipe
doctrine, these two theories were joined to form the basis of the
plaintiff's cause of action despite the fact that the plaintiff pleaded
only one theory of liability. 48 The court supported its analysis by
claiming that "the right and the extent of recovery by the purchaser
of a thing against the seller or manufacturer is governed by the
codal articles providing for responsibility in the seller-purchaser relationship, as applied through C.C. art. 2315."' 149 While Civil Code
articles 2315 and 2316 provide the basis for a purchaser's recovery,
"the court which determines tort responsibility in a particular case
must decide the applicable standard of conduct by consulting the
many other codal articles, statutes and laws [such as the sales articles] which provide for certain responsibilities according to the pers
son involved or to the relationship or activities involved."''
Accordingly, the breach of a manufacturer's obligation to produce a
safe product "gives rise to a cause of action. . . not only to demand
144. Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 151 Ind. App. 217, 279 N.E.2d 266 (1972).
145. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 402A comment c.
146. 395 So. 2d 310 (La.), affd on rehearing, 395 So. 2d 314 (La. 1980). See also S.
LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE-OBLIGATIONS, Bk. 2 § 252 (1975); W. Crawford, Products Liability--The Cause ofAction, 22 LA. B.J. 239 (1975).
147. Phiippe, 395 So. 2d at 319.

148.
attorney's
149.
150.

In Philppe, plaintiff had only demanded tort damages, but the court awarded
fees, available under LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West Supp. 1982).
395 So. 2d at 319.
Id at 318.
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the return of the purchase price, but also

. . .

to demand all dam-

ages caused by the defect and reasonable attorney's fees."' 5 1 The
Louisiana definition of the scope of the manufacturer's liability and
the hybrid and fully compatible measure of damages were perhaps
the most liberal and expansive expression of products liability doctrine. It was achieved by an exceptional accommodation of civilian
151. Id Although the Philippe plaintiff was a purchaser, one would suppose, given the
general orientation of the jurisprudence, that a non-purchaser would fare as well before a
Louisiana court. Media and its progeny, most notably Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La.
1974), put to rest any requirement of privity between the purchaser of a defective product
and the manufacturer. If neither theory of liability requires proof of negligence and if privity is of no moment in the determination, then, a non-purchaser who is entitled to sue a
manufacturer under Civil Code article 2315 should be able to recover under Civil Code
article 2545. The combined theory of recovery would allow a non-purchaser plaintiff to
recover attorney's fees, specifically provided for in article 2545. Whether the extention of
the combined theory to a non-purchaser should permit him to recover value and expectation
damages is a debatable and controversial question. The typical non-purchaser action centers upon a product defect that has resulted in personal injury rather than economic loss. In
order to compensate such a plaintiff fully, it would seem unnecessary to reimburse him for
value loss since he has suffered no pecuniary loss relating to the economic value of the
product. Consequential damages bearing upon the plaintiff's future financial well-being,
however, might be remunerated under a Philope analysis without creating a sense of patent
inequity. Although the courts have yet to confront this problem explicitly, it remains theoretically possible for a non-purchaser to make such a demand on the strength of the recent
jurisprudence. See Philippe, 395 So. 2d at 310; Reeves v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 370 So.
2d 202 (La. App. 1979).
Less innovation has taken place in the area of retailer's liability. Traditionally, a retailer was held liable for personal injuries resulting from breach of warranty only upon a
showing of negligence. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2315, 2531, 2545 (West Supp. 1982); Jones
v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977); Breaux v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 282 So. 2d
763 (La. App. 1973). Former Justice Tate in his dissent in Spillers argued that a retailer, like
a manufacturer, should be held strictly liable as a vendor of a defective article foreseeably
injuring others, due to his placing into commerce articles which create an unreasonable
hazard to others. 294 So. 2d at 810. If the seller had no knowledge of the defect, his liability
would be limited to the restoration of the purchase price and expenses of the sale. LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2531 (West Supp. 1982) . "There is no rule of law in Louisiana which
imputes to the seller of new products. . . knowledge of latent vices and defects, where the
seller is not the manufacturer." Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., 304 So. 2d 695, 699-700
(La. App. 1974). See also Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 294 So. 2d 803 (La. 1974).
For a theory expanding liability of a good faith seller by interpreting the phrase "expenses
occasioned by the sale" to include some damages, see Morrow, supra note 137, at 542. A
retailer was not under a duty to acquire knowledge: he owed a consumer only a duty of
reasonable inspection, not to "make [a] minute inspection for latent defects." Hunt v. Ford
Motor Co., 341 So. 2d 614, 619 (La. App. 1977). In a word, the retailer's liability was circumscribed through the application of a rather narrow notion of foreseeability. If, however,
the seller in fact knew of "the vice of the thing he sold" and failed to warn the purchaser, he
became answerable for damages and attorney's fees. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West
Supp. 1982), as amended by Acts 1968, No. 84, § 1. As former Justice Tate urged in his
Spillers dissent, expansion of retailer liability should be the furture orientation of Louisiana
courts.
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legal notions and policy considerations which underpin products litigation in all jurisdictions.
D. The Application of Civil Code Article 2317 to Products
Liability Litigation
The combination of the Weber, Media, and Hunt doctrines
with Civil Code article 2317 presents the possibility of an even
greater expansion of the plaintiff's remedies in products litigation.
This joining of the decisional law with the substance of article 2317
could lead to the imposition of liability upon a party who is not a
vendor, holding him strictly liable for injuries (and attorney's fees)
resulting from an unusual occurrence, absent any proof of defect in
a product.
Loescher v. Parr is the leading case on liability of the custodian
of a defective thing. 52 There, the court speaking through Justice
Tate and applying article 2317, imposed strict liability upon the custodian of a thing, 5 3 reasoning that article 2317 imposes a duty to
keep one's things in such condition or under such control that they
cause no damage to others.15 4 Prior to Loescher, Louisiana courts
interpreted article 2317 in conjunfction with articles 2315 and 2316,
concluding that fault through negligence was essential for recovery
under article 2317.155 With Loescher, the jurisprudence, recognizing
that legal fault does not presuppose negligence, 5 6 went further by
holding a custodian liable once damage had been proven, regardless
5 7
of whether the particular thing presented an obvious risk of harm.
The proof of custody requirement has led to a rather limited
application of article 2317 in the products area. Retailers who fall
within the purview of the article do so because of their status as
guardians of defective things when a customer is injured in a
152.

324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).

153. Id at 447-48.
154. Id Former Justice Tate employed the principle of legal fault, similar to that of
the French under C. civ. article 1384(1). See Jand'heur c. Les Galeries Belfortaises, Feb. 13,

1930, Cass. ch. r6un., Fr., 1930 Periodique et Critique [D.P.] I 57 (note by Ripert).
155. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 338, 223 So. 2d 822, 825 (1969). See
generally Note, Tort-StrictLiabilityforDamages Done by Things in Ones Possession, 51 TUL.

L.

REV.

156.
157.

403 (1977).
324 So. 2d at 445. See Langlois v. Allied Chem., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971).
In Loescher, the damage was caused by a tree which had a defect which was not

discoverable until the accident occurred.
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store. 58 Even a broad interpretation of custody, however, might not
lead to a finding of retailer or manufacturer liability under article
2317 once title has passed and actual custody of the product is relinquished. On the other hand, if custody is equated with control, a
court might reason that a manufacturer, having control at the time
the defect was created, maintained constructive control of the latent
defect until it caused injury. Furthermore, as a conduit in the chain
of enterprise, the retailer presumably could be subrogated to the
manufacturer's liability. While such reasoning is speculative, constructive custody could justify a finding of manufacturer and/or retailer liability under article 2317.
158. See Hunt v. City Stores, Co., 387 So. 2d 585; Marquez v. City Stores, Co., 371 So.
2d 810.
Hester v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 392 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 1980), a recent appellate
court case, is the only decision that is remotely on point and its discussion of the various
theories of recovery not only is lapidary, but also reflects essential confusion. There, suit
was brought against an elevator company (a professional vendor) for injuries sustained
when plaintiffs were trapped inside an elevator. Even though the elevator was admittedly
defective, the court, in a cursory discussion, denied recovery based on Loescher and article
2317. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed to prove custody. The court never
referred to Media or Weber. Although this result and reasoning may be explained in terms
of the de minimus injury involved in the case, it is unfortunate that the court did not seize the
opportunity to explore the logical interplay of the theories of liability particularly in the case
of a non-purchasing "consumer" of a product.
Under the provisions of article 2317, a plaintiff injured by a defective product may sue
any "guardian" of a product. However, article 2317 has been limited to movables. A lessee
of an immovable has traditionally been granted damages under LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts.
670, 2322, 2693, or 2695. See Smith v. Hartfort Acc. & Indem. Co., 399 So. 2d 1193 (La.
App. 1981) for a discussion of lessor liability under these articles. In Cardwell v. Jefferson
Rentals, 379 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 1979), the court expanded the notion of custody to comport with the French concept of sous sa garde; the garde of a thing connotes the "legal
responsibility for its care and keeping." Id at 257 (quoting Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 477 n.6).
Thus, the guardianship contemplated by the article could be associated not only with ownership, but also apply inter alia, to the bailee, the lessee, the usufructuary, the borrower for
use, and the repairman. Verlander, We are Responsible, 2 TUL. Civ. L. FORUM (1974). In
Cardwell, the court held the lessor of a chain hoist liable for injury suffered by lessee's
employee. Determination of custody, actual or constructive, thus would be a question of
fact.
Williams v. Hempen, 396 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 198 1), illustrates a convergence of theories of liability which are most favorable to the plaintiff-consumer. Although technically
Williams was not a products liability case (in the strict sense that there was no sale involved)
the court applied the liberal Marquez definition of defectiveness, i.e., "unusual occurrence,"
to find that a dumpster which "overturned for no apparent reason" was defective under
article 2317. Id at 1002. The lessee of the dumpster was found to have "custody at the time
of the damage." Id at 1001 (citing Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 205 (La.
App. 1977), writ refused, 351 So. 2d 163 (La. 1977)). Therefore the defendant was found
liable.
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E. The Retreat
During this ten-year period, the accomplishments of Louisiana
courts in the products area not only were many, but distinguished
and sophisticated. The broad concept of delictual fault premised
upon considerations of public policy articulated in article 2315 of
the Civil Code had been applied cogently and lucidly to this evolving area of litigation. The courts had minimized the distinction between economic loss and personal injury and furthered the
Greenman rationale even more by contemplating the application of
article 2317 and its custodial liability concept to products litigation.
More importantly, the orientation toward consumer protection had
been solidified considerably by minimizing, if not eliminating, the
troublesome and controversial requirement of proving "unreasonable dangerousness," eventually applying this reasoning to proof of
"defectiveness." Both of these requirements were established by the
occurrence of harm, making the applicable rule totally estranged
from a negligence formulation and grounding determinations on a
pure strict liability theory.
Many of these advances, however, seem to have been put in
jeopardy, if not actually reversed, by the recent Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company. 59 There, a
young worker was killed when a 30-foot aluminum pole he was using to perform construction tasks came into contact with uninsulated high voltage distribution lines located above the construction
site.' 60 At the trial level, the jury returned a $3,000,000 verdict
against Gulf States Utilities, the owner of the overhead lines, and
two executive officers of the victim's employer. Since the plaintiff
had reached a settlement with the latter defendants, the trial court
entered a judgment against Gulf States Utilities in the amount of
$1,000,000.161 On appeal, the court reversed the judgment against
Gulf States Utilities, reasoning the victim's conduct barred his recovery. The decedent, Mr. Kent, was 18 years old and had just
begun his employment with Barber Brothers Contracting Company
at the time of his accident. His task on this project was to make
antihydroplaning grooves in the surface of the highway by pulling a
metal rake, approximately 5 feet wide, across the surface of freshly
poured concrete. The uninsulated wires were some 25 feet above
159.

418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).

160. Id at 495.
161. Id
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the construction site and everyone on the construction site, including the victim, was aware of them. Because other workers needed
the walk bench bridge (a structure on wheels which straddled the
slab) which Kent and his co-worker, Jenkins, were using to transfer
the rake from one side of the poured concrete to the other, they
began to "flip-flop" the rake by hand. They used this method until
they came near the overhead lines; at this juncture, they walked
away from the lines before flipping the rake. 62 Kent and Jenkins
used this "flip-flop" method for about two hours in full view of their
supervisors. Just before the accident, Smith, a cement finisher,
warned Kent of the danger presented by the wires; Kent indicated
that he was aware of them and joked with Smith about them. Jenkins testified that Kent suddently "went up in the air" with the rake
handle.1 63 Kent was electrocuted as a result of the contract of the
metal rake and the wires.
Before the Louisiana Supreme Court, counsel for the plaintiff
advanced three arguments upon which to establish the liability of
Gulf States for the decedent's injury. 64 First, Gulf States had been
negligent in failing to take reasonable steps to guard against this
type of foreseeable injury. Second, under article 2317, Gulf States
should be held strictly liable for the injury since it was the custodian
of the thing which caused the injury. Third, the defendant also
could be held strictly liable because it was engaged in an ultrahazardous activity.
In its majority opinion, the court systematically rejected all
these arguments and reaffirmed the holding of the appellate court.
The breadth of the court's reasoning makes evident that it was taking the Kent facts as an opportunity to reorient the application of
delictual liability principles in the Civil Code. At the outset of its
analysis, the court focused upon the concept of custodial liability in
article 2317 and the expansive Loescher interpretation of that form
of strict liability. Implicitly emphasizing a "floodgates of litigation"
idea, the court stated:
Because the term "thing" encompasses a virtually unlimited
range of subject matter, the Loescher decision has since been
cited by innumerable litigants seeking to avoid the necessity of
proving personal negligence in tort cases. The distinction be162. Id at 496.
163. Id
164. Id
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tween negligence cases and strict liability cases (such as Loescher) has largely been either misunderstood or completely
disregarded. It is therefore appropriate for this court, in determining the applicability of Art. 2317, to review first the distin65
guishing effect of applying strict liability under that article.
The court's subsequent elaboration certainly clarified any misunderstanding that may have existed as to the role of strict liability
under article 2317. However, in doing so, the court essentially eliminated any meaingful distinction between negligence and strict liability. In its assessment, the court propounded the view that a
presumption of the defendant's knowledge of the risks of a thing is
the key difference between a cause of action in negligence and one
in strict liability.166 Under principles of strict liability, the absolute
character of the duty arises as to the discovery of potential risks and
not as to the harmful effects of such risks-the actionable character
of the latter remains a question of reasonableness and foreseeability:
In a strict liability case against the same owner, the claimant
is relieved only of proving that the owner knew or should have
known of the risk involved. The claimant must still prove that
under the circumstances the thing presented an unreasonable risk
of harm which resulted in the damage (or must prove, as some
decisions have characterized this element of proof, that the thing
was defective). The resulting liability is strict in the sense that the
owner's duty to protect against injurious consequences resulting
from the risk does not depend on actual or constructive knowledge of the risk, the factor which usually gives rise to a duty
under negligence concepts. Under strict liability concepts, the
merefact of the owner's relationship with andresponsibilityforthe
damage-causingthing gives rise to an absolute duty to discover the
riskspresentedby the thing in custody. If the owner breaches that
absolute duty to discover, he is presumed to have discovered any
risks presented by the thing in custody, and the owner accordingly will be held liable for failing to take steps to prevent injury
resulting because the thing in his custody presented an unreasonable risk of injury to another.
Thus, while the basis for determining the existence of the
duty (to take reasonable steps to prevent injury as a result of the
thing's presenting an unreasonable risk of harm) is different in
C.C. Art. 2317 strict liability cases and in ordinary negligence
cases, the duty which arises is the same. The extent of the duty
165. Id at 497.
166. Id
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(and the resulting degree of care necessary to fulfill the duty) de-

pends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. 167

By associating defectiveness completely with unreasonable risk
creation and explicitly making the latter a negligence determination,
the court arguably reversed all of the strict liability and products
liability decisional law which preceded Kent. The express language
of article 2317 does not mention the notion of unreasonable risk
creation; rather, it states that: "We are responsible, not only for the
damages occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by
the act of. .. the things which we have in our custody."' 68 The
language of the code creates a classical rule of strict liability, ie.,
liability for personal injury and property damage is predicated upon
the occurrence of harm plus causation without reference to
negligence.
By adapting the liability principle of article 2317 to the language of section 402A and misconstruing the implications of the
"unreasonably dangerous" language contained in that section, Kent
converted a strict rule of liability into a full-blown negligence determination. The presumption of knowledge-of-the-risks analysis fails
to present a meaningful distinction between negligence and strict
liability: an allegedly negligent actor always will be deemed to have
had knowledge of the risks and dangers if his conduct is found to be
unreasonable-the essence of the determination is that he should
have known. If he did not actually know and, therefore, negligently
disregarded the risks, he is liable anyway for breaching his duty to
not create substantial and unwarranted risk of harm. No matter
how subtle, the cloud of analytical verbiage cannot disguise the fact
that the absolute duty as to knowledge of risks is an empty
requirement.
In Kent the court anchors the concept of custodial liability in
negligence principles rather than mere causation. As the court itself
notes, the implications of such an analysis, especially its complete
equating of defectiveness with an unreasonable risk, for strict products liability are considerable:
In products liability cases, the manufacturer is presumed to
know the dangerous propensities of its product and is strictly liable for injuries resulting from the product's unreasonable risk of
167. Id (italics in original, footnote omitted).
168. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2317 (italics added).
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injury in normal use. The claimant nevertheless must prove that
the product presented an unreasonable risk of injury in normal
use (regardless of the manufacturer's knowledge), thus in effect
proving the manufacturer was negligent in placing the product in
commerce with (presumed)knowledge of the danger. 169

As applied to the facts in Kent, the foregoing analysis yields the
following results: the uninsulated character of the lines created a
serious risk of harm of which the defendant was aware. Since there
is no need to presume knowledge here, the question becomes one of
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in taking precautions
to protect others against the risk of harm. The court chracterizes
this analysis of the issues as "essentially a negligence determination," noting that article 2317's "imposition of an absolute duty to
discover the risks presented by the thing in its custody is not helpful
to the determination of Gulf States' liability in this case.' 70 It is
submitted that the absolute duty to discover risks also would be irrelevant in any other custodial liability case. Under this reasoning,
as in the products context, these cases would become negligence
cases and not strict liability determinations. The presumptive absolute-duty-of-knowledge analysis is totally circuitous and meaningless in terms of strict liability. The existence of a risk only
materializes in legal liability terms upon the occurrence of an injury;
once an injury arises, the question of duty in a negligence case addresses the problem of the reasonable character of the injurious conduct. It is immaterial whether a duty of knowledge as to risk has
been breached. Much like the celebrated notion of "negligence in
the air," the modified notion of article 2317 custodial liability advanced by Kent is an absolute duty that is also in the air and equally
unactionable. Its implications for strict products liability in Louisiana are evident and dire.
The court also dismissed the plaintifis contention that Gulf
States should be held liable on an ultrahazardous activity theory.
The court correctly perceived that the classical form of strict liability
articulated in Rylands v. Fletcher'7' and subsequent cases differs to
some extent from custodial liability and products liability. 7 2 It is a
form of strict liability which was created to deal with socially-beneficial activities which presented a substantial degree of risk no mat169.
170.
171.
172.

418 So. 2d at 498 n.6 (italics in original).
Id at 498.
3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, [1861-1873] All E.R. 1, 19 L.T.R. (n.s.) 220 (1868).
418 So. 2d at 501 (Marcus, J., concurring).
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ter how careful an actor might be in exercising these activities, e.g.,
pile driving, storage of toxic gas, blasting with explosives, and the
like. 73 The court further opined that this form of strict liability is
"an absolute liability (as contrasted to the strict liability . . . ),
which virtually makes the enterpriser an insurer."' 74 Under this
theory, "liability is imposed as a matter of policy when harm results
from the risks inherent in the nature of the activity '' 75 no matter
how careful the enterpriser may have been in attempting to protect
others from the inherent risk of the activity.
Applying this analysis to the facts in Kent, the court reasoned
that:
[t]he transmission of electricity over isolated high tension
power lines is an everyday occurrence in every parish in this state
and can be done without a high degree of risk of injury. And
when the activity results in injury, it is almost always because of
substandard conduct on the part of either the utility, the victim or
a third party.
We accordingly conclude that Gulf States should not be held
absolutely liable, as an enterpriser engaged in ultrahazardous activities, when its activity of transmitting electricity is a cause-infact of injury to another, unless fault was proved on Gulf States'
part. 76
However one might assess the court's application of the ultrahazardous activity form of strict liability to the Kent facts (and one
could certainly criticize the manner in which the court classifies the
activity in question and its use of a "frequency" rationale in conjunction with risk creation to arrive at that assessment), one must
scrutinize the court's segregation of the various forms of strict liability and the implications of the distinctions it establishes. Although
custodial liability and products liability are not exact replicas of the
Rylands variety of strict liability, they nonetheless remain forms of
or are intended to function as no-fault schemes of liability. In their
intended form, they give rise to absolute duties in the sense that the
duty they impose is one of guaranteeing that certain results do not
occur. Similar to the Rylands type of liability, they have been im173.

Id; Accord W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971).

174. 418 So. 2d at 498 (italics in original).
175. Id at 498.
176. Id at 498-99.
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posed as a matter of policy and ultimately make the obligor an insurer of safety in regard to certain parties.
For example, the Greenman decision justified the application of
a strict rule in the products liability area in terms of public policy, in
the name of the "powerless consumer." There, the court felt (and
ultimately the drafters of section 402A of the Restatement agreed)
that the risk creation stemming from products in a highly technological, mass-producing, commercial society was equivalent to ultrahazardousness, that the consumer could not guard against
harmful defects and had substantial evidentiary problems in making
his case in negligence, and that the manufacturer was strategically
located to safeguard the consumer and to pay for the cost of inevitable injury. Rather than establish negligence, the Greenman-Section
4024 plaintiff was required to prove defectiveness and that the latter produced his injury. The Rylands plaintiff had the burden of
convincing the court that the activity which caused his injury fell
into the category of ultrahazardous activities.
These theories of absolute liability are separable from one another only in the sense that they emerged at different times and in
response to different circumstances. The strict rule in products liability is an extension of the original Rylands principle to a different
state of society. The duty and remedy provided are no less absolute
or clear in their direction.
Custodial liability, a vintage concept in the civil law, is no less
unequivocal in its statement of policy and in its imposition of a
duty. The custodian of a thing is placed in much the same position
as the manufacturer of products. In the words of the Kent court,
The theory is that the owner-guardian is regarded as the riskcreator because of his relationship with the thing which presents
the risk. As between him and the faultless victim injured as a
result of the risk, the owner-guardian theoretically should bear
the loss, because he was in1 7 7the best position to discover the risk
and to prevent the injury.
Although there are a variety of circumstances in which a strict
theory of liability may be applied, that fact does not mean that there
are greater and lesser forms of absolute duties. The circumstancesthings, products, ultrahazardous activities-may differ, but the essence of the theory (if it does apply) remains intact. One cannot
speak of no-fault liability in name and apply principles of fault lia177. Id at 497 n.5.
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bility in practice, grounding the eventual result in both propositions
simultaneously. These principles of liability are, by definition, mutually exclusive.
Having excluded other theories of liability, the Kent court resolved the case in terms of negligence:
Gulf States' conduct at issue in this case is its decision not to take
additional precautions (such as installing rubber hose in the area
of construction) beyond the precaution of insulating its lines by
isolation, which was done in the original construction
of the lines.
78
We find that conduct not to be unreasonable.1
What is abhorrent about Kent is not its result. As some of the concurring opinions illustrate, the court could have disposed of the case
and reached the same result on other grounds (i.e., the failure to find
a defect, as required by article 2317, in the wires, the ample evidence
of victim fault). The unacceptable conceptual quality of the majority opinion, which is reinforced strongly by Justice Dennis' concurring opinion, resides in the unjustifiable dismembering of strict
liability notions. Prior to Kent, Louisiana could boast of perhaps
the most advanced and sophisticated products liability theory in the
country. Products liability theory had been patiently elaborated by
the courts over a decade, responded perfectly to the Greenman reasoning, and-most importantly-was firmly grounded in the substance of the existing code provisions. It corresponded well with, for
example, the well-settled view that legal fault under article 2315
transcends negligence and involves public policy considerations.
Article 2317 seemed tailor-made to legitimize an absolute duty for
things in commerce which turned out to be defective and produced
injury. Substantial, admittedly consumer-minded, advances had
been achieved in defining defectiveness and the measure of damages. In what must have been an attempt to respond to what is perceived as a "products liability" crisis, the Kent court arguably
"gutted" those developments and redefined the entire orientation of
the delictual liability provisions in the Civil Code. Looking at the
problem as an all-or-nothing proposition, it invented a new and
meaningless duty of absolute knowledge as to risk and restated the
strict liability principle unequivocally in negligence language.
The English courts, in recent decisions, have tended to disguise
strict liability results behind the cloak of presumptions of negligence, in light of the legislative refusal to move ahead with a strict
178. Id at 500.
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rule in products. By contrast, the courts in Louisiana have gone
from incorporating Greenman and section 402A in their decisional
law-creating the most advanced domestic expression of Strict Liability--to arguably abandoning strict liability altogether by exclusively focusing upon an unreasonable risk analysis. It is in this
sense that products liability, nationally and internationally, remains
a frontier area of legal analysis. The Kent holding, in fact, may precipitate a legislative reassessment of Louisiana products liability
law.
F

PossibleLegislative Reconsideration

Responding to what it perceived to be "recent [possibly detrimental] changes in product liability laws" and "the crisis reported to
be facing manufacturers and sellers,"' 79 the Louisiana legislature
formally requested the State Law Institute to study the pre-Kent decisional law on products liability and submit recommendations for
possible change. 80 In its request to the Institute, the legislature expressed concern that the "explosion in the numbers of product liability suits is seriously affecting the production of goods,"'' 1
engendering increased costs and inflation due to higher insurance
premiums. 8 2 In October 1982, a preliminary report was presented to
the Law Institute Council, suggesting that the dilemma be resolved
by "strik[ing] a reasonable balance between requiring compensation
by the manufacturer to victims of product injury, and treating the
manufacturer with basic fairness." 8 3 A critical examination of the
preliminary report, however, reveals that the proposed "balance"
would be heavily weighted in favor of manufacturers.
If enacted the recommendations would consolidate "all product
liability recovery theories into one," and preempt any conflicting
statutes. 84 While article 2315 ostensibly would remain the doctrinal
basis of delictual liability, manufacturer "fault" would be defined
179.

La. S. Con. Res. 135, 1979 Reg. Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as RESOLUTION No.

1351.
180. Id
181. Id at 1. The Resolution did not suggest any factual support for this conclusion.

182. Id The Resolution cited as an example a small manufacturer's rising insurance
premiums, which purportedly increased from $425 per year in 1973 to over $37,000 per year
in 1978. Id.

183. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF
THE LAW INSTITUTE BY THE COMMITTEE FOR REVISION OF THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
184. Id at 4.
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exclusively by the proposed Act. 8 5 Accordingly, products liability
law would be divorced from the regulatory framework of the Code.
A separate body of law applying to products litigation may be
desirable; however, the report falls short of achieving even this end.
The proposed Act would not include any claims involving damages
to the product itself or for economic losses arising therefrom. 8 6 The
contractual provisions for purchaser remedies under the redhibition
articles would continue to govern such claims. Only consequential
damages to persons or other property not involving the product
would fall within the ambit of the Act. The purpose of drawing this
distinction, allegedly, is to eliminate the overlap between the contractual and delictual provisions of the Code.18 7 More particularly,
the report endeavors to limit recovery of attorney's fees to cases
brought by a purchaser for breach of contract. Unfortunately, it
leaves unclear whether such a purchaser who has a tort claim in
addition to his contract claim would need to bring two separate
suits. If the objective of the proposed Act is to eliminate the award
of attorney's fees in products cases brought under a tort theory, separate suits seem inevitable. Otherwise, either an injured purchaser
could effectively circumvent the statute by claiming that the fees related only to the contract portion of the suit, or a court would be
forced to apportion the fees. Separate suits would be both a hollow
solution to the problem of inequitable recovery of attorney's fees
and a spur to an increase in the numbers of cases. If the concern is
that it is unfair that only purchasers, and not other claimants, can
recover attorney's fees, perhaps the extension of recovery to nonpurchasers would be the more equitable and practical solution. In
its request, the legislature noted that there had been a 438% increase
in the number of product suits filed in Louisiana between 1974 and
1978.188 If the proposal is enacted and separate suits for tort damage and contract damage are required, the number of suits in this
area might double.
It is evident that proposed changes in the elements of a products liability cause of action would have a considerable impact on
the plaintiff-consumer's right to recover. Although the proposal
might clarify otherwise nebulous doctrines, some attention must be
paid to the injured consumer's right to judicial reparation. Under
185. Id at 4-5.
186. Id at6.
187. Id at 5-6.
188. RESOLUTION No. 135, supra note 179, at 1.
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the proposal, a claimant would first have to prove that the defendant
manufactured the product or actually exercised control over the
manufacturing process. 89 Under the existing law, it is sufficient for
a victim to show that the seller had the "capacity" to control the
manufacturing of a product.' 90 At first blush, the proposed provision
appears reasonable; only a seller who actually designed or otherwise
influenced the product should be attributed the status of a manufacturer. Such a requirement, however, seems to place an inordinate
burden of proof upon a claimant who may have a difficult time
gaining the appropriate information.
Provided the claimant satisfies the court that the defendant is
the proper party, he then must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous. The proposed Act restricts the manufacturer's duty
to provide a product free from unreasonable danger to four areas:
1) construction/composition of the product; 2) design of the product; 3) warnings or instructions for the product; and 4) express warranties made concerning the product. 191 Strict liability for injuries
occasioned by the product would only lie in cases involving construction defects or erroneous express warranties.192 All other cases
193
would be decided on the basis of negligence.
For a product to be found defective as to construction or composition, the variation in a manufacturer's specifications must be
"material" and that particular variation must be the cause of the
claimant's harm. 194 Broad leeway is afforded a court in deciding
materiality and no guidance is offered regarding appropriate standards. Further, the claimant is placed in the untenable position of
having to prove a technical aberration that, in all probability, was
not apparent to the manufacturer himself.
The victim who claims a product caused harm because of a design defect must establish that the likelihood or gravity of his harm
or similar harm outweighs both the burden on a manufacturer to
design a safer product and the adverse effect of alternative designs
on the usefulness of the product. 19 A manufacturer could successfully defend against such a claim by showing that the alternative
189. ld at 7.
190. Id at 8. See Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
191. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 183, at 9.
192. Id at 14, 19.
193. Id at 14-18.
194. Id at 14.
195. Id at 15.
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or
design was not feasible, based upon either "economic practicality
19 6
existing technological knowledge," to produce a safer product.
Also, the report recommends the adoption of a "consumer-expectancy test" to etablish the extent of a manufacturer's duty to
warn. 197 Accordingly, if the dangers associated with a product are
greater than those "which would be contemplated by an ordinary
person,"' 98 the manufacturer must take adequate steps to communicate those dangers to the actual user of the product. 99 While this
formulation of the duty to warn is in line with decisional law, the
report's characterization of the measure of a manufacturer's duty to
discover dangers is ambiguous:
No concept of "reasonableness" is included with regard to ascertainability of the danger from a technological standpoint although the precise level of the manufacturer's overall duty to
discover dangers associated with the product is significantly short
it is also considerably distant from
of being one of strict liability,
2°°
a negligence standard.
The most learned jurist would have difficulty extracting a workable
standard from such obfuscated language. Courts would be provided
with legislation that is less precise than the standards under existing
case law.
Regarding the manufacturer's duty to refrain from extending
erroneous express warranties, the proposal provides a remedy to a
victim if the "harm was induced by reliance by claimant or another
upon the erroneous warranty."'20 ' Accordingly, the duty would be
expanded to encompass situations in which the claimant himself did
not rely on the warranty, but another person, such as the claimant's
employer or parent, did. Such an amplification of existing law comports with commercial realities and present notions of consumer
protection.
Once the claimant has established that a manufacturer has produced an unreasonably dangerous product, he must then prove that
his harm was proximately caused by the dangerous aspects of the
product and that the product had been neither misused nor altered.
The proposal eliminates any reference to "normal use" suggested by
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id The proposal refers to this as the "state of the art" defense.
Id at 16.
Id at 17.
Id at 18.
Id at 17.
Id at 19.
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the Weber court202 on the ground that the courts indiscriminately
applied the concept both to the manner of use of the product at the
time of the accident and post-manufacture changes which substantially modified the product itself.20 3 While the report explicitly dis-

tinguishes the concepts of "misuse" and "alteration or
modification," the burden in both instances is upon the claimant to
negate their applicability. 20 4 The drafters of the report rationalize
this reallocation of the burden of proof:
Since the evidence relating to "misuse" and "alteration or modification" is ordinarily more accessible to claimant than to the manufacturer, and since with increasing frequency the manufacturer's
first notice of the accident is when suit is filed and even then the
product may be lost or otherwise no longer available, this burden
was felt properly imposed on claimant. 20 5
One wonders, however, why the claimant is better suited to sustain
this burden if the injurious product is destroyed in the accident. It
seems that this reallocation of the burden of proof could foreclose
recovery in cases most deserving relief.
If the claimant is successful, his damages may be reduced because of "any fault of the claimant which was the proximate cause
of his injury, including ordinary negligence and assumption of the
risk."206 Existing jurisprudence only recognized assumption of risk

as a defense upon proof of which a claimant's recovery was totally
denied. 20 7 The potential effect of this provision would be to allow a
limited recovery to a claimant who is found to have assumed the
risk of harm while restricting the recovery of the "negligent" victim.
The report claims that this provision is "inaccord with the current
trend of the American jurisprudence" as well as recent Louisiana
decisions. 20 8
V.

CONCLUSION

What conclusions can be derived from the study of these three
different responses to the question of liability for harm resulting
202.

250 So. 2d at 755.

203. PRELIMINARY
204. Id at 11.
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id

REPORT,

supra note 183, at 10.

at 10-11.
at 22.

208. Id The report cites Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981) as beginning the
"trend in Louisiana as to non-commercial defendants." Id at 27.
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from the use of products? What has been achieved in terms of the
doctrinal integrity of a body of law still in evolution? From the
perspective of the advocacy of consumer interests, English law proposes the least satisfactory doctrinal response, holding steadfastly to
the application of fault through conventional means in this area.
Even the goal of the harmonization of community law and its
salutory effects do not appear to have attenuated the English view
that the determination of fault is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of legal liability. This reasoning applies even though contemporary English courts seem to be manipulating the doctrine of
res 6psa loquitur to arrive at strict liability results-the majority response to products liability in Escola. Fault-based determinations-in the Holmes and Cardozo sense of legal fault as an
exceptional finding designed to punish wrongful conduct-seem to
be at the heart of most of the traditional English tort liability
holdings.
The application of doctrine in this way stems in part, at least
from the particular features of English society; unlike American
courts, English courts do not have to contend with an unstated social insurance factor. They have no need to give the compensatory
function of tort law primacy over its retributive aim since the existing social welfare system already provides much of the necessary
compensation. Moreover, products litigation accounts for a statistically insignificant portion of personal injury litigation in England; a
fraction of 1% of the total cases. The question of whether England
should lend its support to the EEC Draft Directive, then, becomes
not an issue of whether strict liability, however defined, is an appropriate liability calculus in products litigation, but rather an issue of
national sovereignty, an entirely different consideration which goes
beyond the confines of the usual debate concerning products
liability.
United States' jurisprudence has moulded the liberal response
to products liability problems. Under both the decisional law and
the Restatement, the critical question becomes one of how far the
advances should be taken? What sort of strict liability is envisaged
in the products area? Are we speaking merely about establishing a
defect and proving causation or is the burden more extensive, one
which includes some element of unreasonableness and, therefore,
fault in a traditional sense? These are preliminary questions which
have yet to be resolved conclusively and which will color the determination of subsequent and more technical questions such as tech-
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nological feasibility, the useful safe life notion, compliance with
government standards, unavoidably dangerous products, and the effect of manufacturer's warnings. It seems that what the English
have accomplished through their social welfare system while maintaining a purist position on legal doctrine has yet to be achieved in
the United States.
The voice of consumer protection, it seems, was heard for a
time most effectively in Louisiana where social policy imperatives
underlying products litigation combined with a uniquely responsive
judicial doctrine anchored in civil law delictual notions. No other
United States' common law or other civilian jurisdiction had taken
the plight of the consumer so seriously. After the incorporation of
the common law 402A standard into Louisiana lav in the seminal
Weber decision, the courts progressively refined that standard into
what it was originally intended to say: the liability of a manufacturer was triggered once his product, due to its defectiveness, caused
harm to a user of that product. Fault, in the sense of unreasonable
conduct or unreasonable dangerousness, was not a consideration;
rather, the applicable standard was fault in the sense of Civil Code
article 2315-legal liability imposed for reasons of social policy.
Moreover, Louisiana jurisprudence interpreted the elements of
the strict liability rule in such a fashion as to foster (rather than
defeat) its underlying social policy. The Marquez-Hunt definition of
defectiveness as an unusual occurrence left the injured plaintiff essentially with the sole burden of proving causation. While the
SealY-Santor debate was still raging in most United States' jurisdictions, the Philippe case abolished any distinction between tort and
contract remedies, thereby further alleviating the plaintiff's evidentiary burden. The Louisiana courts' liberal perception of products
liability indeed was exemplary for advocates of consumer protection. The motivation for such a stance was difficult to isolate precisely. It could have arisen from the provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code on redhibition, which strongly imply a consumer protection rationale, and from the general protection the Civil Code affords to disadvantaged persons, such as minors, through the concept
of lesion.
Be that as it may, the Kent decision portends rather ominously
the continued viability of this decisional law. Moreover, proposals
have been made to reduce the jurisprudential interpretations of ex-
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isting code provisons into a comprehensive "Louisiana Product Liability Act." The express purpose of this suggested legislation is:
to strike a reasonable balance between requiring compensation
by the manufacturer to victims of product injury, and treating the
manufacturer with basic fairness, taking into account that the
overall best interests of society at large are not served by making
the tort-litigation system the means for2°9addressing injuries and
damage caused by all product hazards.
Such a proposal would reintegrate Louisiana law into a more skeptical mainstream by having it adopt a reticent posture in the face of a
strict products liability rule and robbing it of its unique experimental thrust, all in the name of equity and reasonableness to large commercial concerns. Of course, any limitation of liability will lead to
better predictability (if that is the social policy objective of products
liability law). Moreover, it seems that a rule of limited liability will
create a lesser incentive to make safe products than a rule of absolute liability.
As a final note in this comparative assessment, one would hope
that, given the unique and original stature of the Louisiana decisional law, any proposed legislation would take into account more
directly the innovativeness of the jurisprudence and not sound a retreat from the type of doctrinal experimentation that is unparalleled
in any other jurisdiction.
209.
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